Pelosi Hints Biden Should Reconsider 2024 Run Amid Growing Concerns

In a recent development, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi suggested that President Joe Biden might need to rethink his 2024 reelection bid. During an interview on July 2, 2024, Pelosi acknowledged voters’ concerns about Biden’s age and mental fitness, calling these worries “legitimate” and urging both Biden and former President Donald Trump to undergo mental acuity tests​​.

Pelosi’s remarks come amid increasing speculation and anxiety within the Democratic Party following Biden’s underwhelming performance in the first presidential debate. His struggles during the debate, marked by a hoarse voice and moments of confusion, have fueled doubts about his ability to secure a victory against Trump in the upcoming election.

Speaker Pelosi tells me Biden can win

She says she won’t make comments in the hallway about “the fate of our nation”

When I asked if Biden should run she said

“Am I speaking English to you? I’m not going to be making any statements about any of that right now in the hallway..” pic.twitter.com/8R1KsTuTc0

— Rachel Scott (@rachelvscott) July 10, 2024

Pelosi stressed the importance of Biden demonstrating his capabilities through interviews with serious journalists to reassure the public of his competence​​.

Despite defending Biden’s track record and personal integrity, Pelosi’s comments hint at a broader unease among Democrats. The former Speaker emphasized the necessity for transparency and suggested that both presidential candidates should be willing to undergo any necessary tests to prove their fitness for office​​.

Whoever took the parlay of AOC being on team “the matter is closed” and Pelosi being on team “the matter is not quite closed” can collect their winnings. https://t.co/IMuZ9FAGx8

— Philip Klein (@philipaklein) July 10, 2024

This debate over Biden’s candidacy has been amplified by calls from other prominent Democrats and media outlets for him to consider stepping down.

Notably, some Democratic members of Congress and media voices have been vocal about the need for new leadership, fearing that Biden may not be able to effectively challenge Trump in the general election​​.

Pelosi’s cautious approach reflects a strategic concern within the party. While acknowledging Biden’s accomplishments, she also highlighted the need for him to convincingly present his vision, judgment, and knowledge to the American people. Pelosi’s remarks are part of a broader narrative pushing for clarity and confidence in Biden’s leadership as the election season heats up​.

As the political landscape continues to evolve, Pelosi’s statements underscore a critical moment for the Democratic Party. The coming months will likely see increased scrutiny on Biden’s campaign and potential discussions about alternative candidates if his performance does not improve. This internal debate is a testament to the high stakes and intense pressure facing the Democratic leadership as they prepare for a contentious 2024 election​.

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The Case for Vance

The Case for Vance

Trump should redouble his appeal to the voters who backed him in 2016.

As the clock counts down to the revelation of Donald Trump’s running mate, old possibilities are drawing new attention. Observers spot that Kristi Noem has deleted her gubernatorial Twitter/X account. Reporters expecting a Saturday announcement note Marco Rubio is the only contender scheduled to appear with Trump that day. A friend texts a rumor he heard from a medium-reliable private source warning that’s going to be Nikki Haley after all.

For weeks, Doug Burgum led the betting markets’ odds. Trump would go for a businessman who looks exactly the way a CEO should look, right? Burgum would reassure Wall Street Journal Republicans, and his personal wealth could be put to immediate use by the Trump campaign.

But Trump’s pick won’t be any of the above, if good counsel prevails. The best vice president for a second Trump term, for reasons of substance and electoral advantage alike, is Ohio’s Senator J.D. Vance—hands down.

Pennsylvania is the biggest prize of the battleground states, and the Rust Belt has more Electoral College votes in play than the Sunbelt does. The troubled industrial Midwest made Trump president the first time in 2016, but he lost ground with the region’s working-class white voters in 2020. Those losses were not offset by the gains Trump made with Hispanics and blacks. Would it make sense for Trump to try for a greater share of non-white voters this time with Marco Rubio or Tim Scott on his ticket—or for him to try to get back the decisive margin with whites he enjoyed in 2016? 

Vance has the profile best suited to appeal to the white working class, though he’ll help the ticket with non-white workers, too. Naysayers doubt this: They point out that Vance won his Senate seat in 2022 by only a six-point margin, an underperformance compared to other Republicans running for statewide office. But those Republicans weren’t running against Tim Ryan, a Democrat who was once tipped as a presidential prospect for his ability to connect with the working class. Ryan did actually take a shot at the Democratic presidential nomination in 2020, styling himself as a “progressive who knows how to talk to working class people.”

The correct lesson to draw from the 2022 midterms was never that right-wing populism had failed—it was that control of the Senate hinged on which party more successfully fielded populist candidates. John Fetterman is the proof. His health was as obvious a concern as Biden’s is now. But Fetterman was easily the more populist candidate relative to the celebrity doctor nominated by the GOP, Mehmet Oz. The Democrat won by a little less than five points. Suppose, however, that J.D. Vance had been the GOP’s nominee in Pennsylvania rather than in Ohio. Democrats are stronger in Pennsylvania than they are in Ohio, but it’s not difficult to imagine Vance overcoming Fetterman. He would certainly have done better than Oz. And Tim Ryan was a tougher opponent than Fetterman, even taking into account Ohio’s Republican tilt.

If any Republican could have won Pennsylvania’s U.S. Senate seat in 2022, it would have been Vance or someone very like him. And if anyone can reinforce and extend Trump’s claim upon working-class white voters in the Keystone State, as he takes on the Fetterman-like Biden, it’s Vance. (Fetterman and Biden are, to be sure, on opposite trajectories today: The former’s condition has improved, the latter’s is getting worse.)

What’s true for Pennsylvania is broadly true for the other Rust Belt battlegrounds, including Michigan and Wisconsin. If Vance’s public persona doesn’t seem to fit Arizona quite so well, the key to a Trump victory in that Sunbelt state, and others, is immigration. Vance is as forceful as Trump on that issue and would only help the ticket articulate its restrictionist message. Trump is already leading in Arizona polls anyway, and while his campaign can’t afford to take its edge for granted, there are other states where it needs a boost more—chiefly the old steel-belt states for which Vance is the best fit.

Trump has a deficit with women voters that Vance may not help erase. But he had such a deficit in 2016 and prevailed nevertheless. Recapturing and expanding his margin with voters who already have shown a propensity to back him is a better strategy for Trump than seeking to win over voters who have twice rejected him. Trump probably can’t outbid a Democratic ticket featuring an incumbent female vice president by putting a woman on the Republican undercard—particularly if that woman is as maladroit as Kristi Noem has proved to be in her numerous media flaps. Nikki Haley’s electoral magnetism, meanwhile, is largely imaginary: she’s a canvas onto which disgruntled moderates, both Democrat and Republican, project what they wish to see. Were she to share a ticket with Trump, however, those same moderates’ antipathy toward him would outdo their enthusiasm for her—while for populists, Haley’s presence would be an obstacle to voting for the Republican ticket.

The greater problem with Haley, however, and to some degree with almost all of the possibilities other than Vance, is how damaging she would be to Trump and his agenda were she to actually become vice president. Although one of Franklin Roosevelt’s vice presidents, John Nance Garner, described the role of VP as “not worth a bucket of warm spit,” it can be dangerous in the wrong hands. And in every one of the last four Republican administrations, the vice president’s office has been a power center for neoconservatives. This was true when George H.W. Bush was Ronald Reagan’s VP; when Dan Quayle was Bush’s VP (and neoconservative princeling Bill Kristol was Quayle’s chief of staff); when Dick Cheney was George W. Bush’s VP; and when Mike Pence was Donald Trump’s VP. Behind the scenes, Pence’s people worked to keep populist conservatives and foreign-policy realists out of the Trump administration, and Pence personnel made little secret—at least within elite conservative circles—of their opposition to Trump’s economic nationalism. 

Trump needs a vice president who will support his agenda, not the neoconservatives’. A Republican who is not consciously and intelligently populist and realist will not do: Whether or not Doug Burgum is a neocon, conventional Republicans like him can never be counted on to keep the neoconservatives out. Vance, on the other hand, knows neoconservatism well enough to be on guard, not least because he was once a contributor to a neocon website, David Frum’s FrumForum. Vance had already left neoconservatism behind when he published Hillbilly Elegy in 2016, though he hadn’t yet come around to Trump’s brand of populism. In the years since then, Vance has anchored himself firmly on the populist right. He’s also demonstrated deep loyalty to Trump, which has earned him the hatred of Trump’s enemies. Vance is a man of no mean achievements as businessman, writer, and Marine—yet he’s been unafraid of admitting he was wrong about Trump. He’s chosen the side of Trump and populism over all the respect and riches the establishment had to offer. 

That suggests Vance will be a faithful successor to Trump if he’s the GOP presidential nominee in 2028. Having experienced the lawfare waged against him by Democrats since he left the White House, Trump is acutely aware of the dangers he, his family, and his supporters may all face after a second term. To mitigate the peril, it’s vital to Trump that he be followed in office not only by another Republican, but by a Republican who will risk his own political capital to ensure fair treatment for an ex-president who will no longer be in a position to demand fealty. It would be all too easy for a faithless successor, once he enjoys power in his own right, to view the ex-president as a political liability to be turned over to his vengeful enemies. A vice president who is lukewarm in his support for populism—who comes from a more conventional wing of the GOP—is likely to be lukewarm in his willingness to prevent partisan retribution, too. Vance is more trustworthy than any alternative.

Vance is the best possible investment in the GOP’s future, and the populist right’s. He amplifies all the themes that Trump brought to the fore of American politics, from a foreign policy of greater realism and restraint to reducing immigration and reforming America’s economy and institutions to support families and working people better. He has also become a great communicator of those themes, speaking with an ease born of authenticity and reflection, as well as self-correction. Unlike all too many of his colleagues, he learns. So his stature grows.

Trump and those closest to him have seen this, and they can’t fail to recognize the contrast between Vance and most other politicians, even of the better sort. Vance is a running mate who would add political momentum to the ticket, especially in the states where it counts most. He would also, however, and more importantly, secure the future that Trump is building.

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NATO’s Pathway to Hell Was Paved With Good Intentions

NATO’s Pathway to Hell Was Paved With Good Intentions

Baltic expansion was understandable, but misguided.

(By Gints Ivuskans/Shutterstock)

As NATO leaders descend upon Washington, D.C. for the 75th anniversary summit of the alliance, the question of Ukraine’s prospective membership amid a brutal war with Russia looms large. Supporters of Ukraine joining the alliance, such as the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, reportedly push for a commitment to the country’s “irreversible path” to the alliance. 

Not everybody is convinced, however: a group of sixty U.S. national security experts warned against Ukraine’s NATO membership in a letter spearheaded by Carnegie Endowment’s senior fellow Stephen Wertheim. The letter says that Ukraine’s inclusion would probably not deter future aggression from Russia. It would commit the U.S. and allies to fight Russia directly, which would reduce the security of the alliance members, the authors argue. 

The seeds of our current predicament were sowed in the late 1990s, when decisions were made on the first waves of NATO enlargement. At the time, I served as a mid-ranking diplomat in the Latvian embassy in Washington, D.C. and witnessed the policy debates surrounding the process first-hand.

The Clinton administration was the primary driver of the enlargement, supported by a large consensus within the Republican party of the day (albeit for different reasons). Yet that drive was not accompanied by a strategic clarity on the enlargement’s scope and purpose. Clinton’s officials tried to balance the NATO “open doors” policy—meaning expansion without clearly defined geographical limits—with engagement with Boris Yeltsin’s Russia. That effort was cloaked in the language of a “Europe whole and free”—NATO enlargement was treated as a means to consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet satellite countries by anchoring them firmly in the West. 

At the same time, Clinton was aware of the dangers of alienating Russia, and offered inducements to make the NATO enlargement more palatable to Moscow, such as establishing the NATO–Russia Council.

Yet the candidate countries themselves, and particularly the Baltics, were always clear what the NATO expansion was all about: a protective shield against Moscow. They saw NATO for what it fundamentally was: not a club of democracies but a military alliance with the mutual defense clause enshrined in Article 5. Therefore, the Baltic lobbying activities were focused on overcoming the so-called “Russian veto”—the assumption that an inclusion of the Baltic states, as former Soviet republics, would be a step too far in provoking hostile reaction from Moscow.

The Baltics can hardly be blamed for their persistence—there opened a window of opportunity to join the West after the decades of Soviet depredations, with its promise of freedom and security. Even post-Soviet Russia was a chaotic, corrupt and often violent place that fought bloody wars against secessionists in its own North Caucasus, and didn’t inspire much confidence in a democratic, peaceful future. 

Yet, however justified and understandable the Baltic desire to join NATO, it imposed additional security commitments on the United States. Little thought was expended on how to ensure the defensibility of the Baltic states given their geographical proximity to Russia. That is because at the time no proponent of the NATO enlargement seriously considered the possibility that the newly incurred security obligations were actually ever going to be put to test. 

That is certainly not how Russians saw things. For them, NATO expansion meant an inexorable encroachment of a military alliance, led by their Cold War adversary, on their borders. They voiced their concerns. American officials at the time were baffled by Russian reactions as, they insisted, the U.S. harbored no hostile intentions. Whatever objections Moscow had, then, must have been irrational and down to lingering imperial mindset. 

Whatever role imperial nostalgia may have played, it is far more plausible that Moscow’s opposition to NATO enlargement, spread across the political spectrum, was primarily due to the fact that NATO was becoming the centerpiece of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe. Not only Russia was not part of it, but the logic of NATO expansion explicitly treated Russia as a potential threat to be insured against. That is the reason why Moscow never perceived the NATO–Russia Council as anything more than a second-rate consolation prize rather than a truly meaningful platform for security dialogue. By abandoning George H.W. Bush’s cautious approach in dealing with Moscow and championing the expansion of NATO instead, the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations assumed security commitments towards more countries in Europe even though that fueled growing Russian resentment and hostility towards the U.S. and those countries.

There were at the time American experts who warned about risks inherent in such a course of action. The intellectual author of the Cold War–era containment policy against the Soviet Union George Kennan called the NATO expansion a fateful error. Susan Eisenhower, the granddaughter of President Dwight D.Eisenhower, assembled an impressive group of national security experts in 1997 to warn against an open-ended nature of NATO expansion and how it could call into question the viability of U.S. security guarantees. The CATO Institute’s Ted Galen Carpenter was prophetic in saying that NATO expansion would lead to new dividing lines in Europe and “a set of dangerous security obligations for the United States”. 

Those warnings were dismissed in the over-confident, almost hubristic environment of the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is to be hoped that the current generation of Western leaders, as they gather in Washington, will be more judicious as they ponder on what credible security commitments in Europe they can undertake while paying more attention to the growing political tendencies towards foreign policy restraint in their own countries.   

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It Is Time to Shut Ukraine’s Door to NATO

It Is Time to Shut Ukraine’s Door to NATO

The alliance isn’t a social club.


Credit: Alexandros Michailidis

NATO is celebrating its 75th anniversary in Washington. The latest summit has proceeded like past meetings, filled with unrealistic promises, self-indulgent predictions, and sanctimonious warnings. Despite welcome increases in European military outlays, NATO remains North America and the Others. Only the U.S. is capable of waging war against nuclear-armed Russia. 

The meeting featured the Ukraine lobby’s continuing campaign to bring Kiev into NATO, using a supposedly defensive alliance to entangle NATO members, especially America, in the Russo–Ukrainian war. The strongest support for doing so comes from countries such as the Baltic states—charity towards all—whose principal duty in a full-scale conflict between NATO and Russia would be to cheer for America as the latter’s cities were incinerated by Russian ICBMs. 

So far President Joe Biden has resisted doing the Full Monty for direct combat in Ukraine. Nevertheless, he has steadily increased the intensity of NATO’s proxy war against Russia. Last month he also initiated a new, 10-year security agreement with Kiev, which provides for consultation “at the highest levels to determine appropriate and necessary measures to support Ukraine and impose costs on Russia.” 

“We are not waiting for the NATO process to be completed to make long-term commitments to Ukraine’s security to address the immediate threats they face and deter any aggression that may occur,” he explained. 

The U.S. should just say no to Ukraine in NATO. The latter’s purpose is to protect members and advance their interests. That originally meant defending against the Soviet Union, to prevent the Red Army from marching through West Germany’s Fulda Gap and on to the Atlantic. It isn’t obvious that Moscow ever intended such a maneuver, but Joseph Stalin was a uniquely evil and threatening figure. Hence America provided a defense shield for Western Europe nations until they recovered economically and politically and could fend for themselves. Yet policymakers including President Dwight D. Eisenhower expected the U.S. troop presence to be temporary. As Eisenhower opined in 1951: “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed.”

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the transatlantic alliance completed its mission. The bad guys were gone, the good guys were triumphant. However, Europeans never warmed to the idea of taking over responsibility for their own defense. After all, Uncle Sam had long doubled as Uncle Sucker. The Europeans worked hard to preserve their place on Washington’s defense dole, proposing new duties for NATO, including, bizarrely, fighting the drug war and promoting student exchanges.

Peace might have persisted if the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations had not treated Russia as a defeated nation, expected to accept whatever Washington deemed Moscow’s just desserts. Vladimir Putin was always an authoritarian by some measure, but he was not always hostile to America. The first foreign leader to call President George W. Bush after 9/11, he also delivered a notably accommodating speech to the German Bundestag just two weeks later. 

Putin’s attitude changed with NATO’s manifold broken promises about NATO expansion and the steady march eastward to Russia’s border. It was easy for allied governments to insist that Putin should not fear such an advance, but history hangs heavily over a country that suffered three devastating invasions from European powers over the last two centuries. As William Burns, then U.S. ambassador to Russia, noted in 2008, “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players…. I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in NATO as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests.”

Nor was that all. The allies promised NATO membership to Ukraine (and Georgia). Moreover, Washington and its allies turned the organization into an aggressive weapon in the wars against Serbia and Libya, which had neither attacked nor threatened any NATO member. In the first case, the allies declared their unilateral authority to dismember a sovereign nation, one with historic ties to Moscow. Russian anger flared at the grassroots as well as among elites. There also were allied-backed color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, as well as the 2014 allied support for a street putsch against an elected Ukrainian president who retained substantial backing in his nation’s Russophile east. Western officials may have seen themselves as modern Vestal Virgins, chosen by providence to bring heaven to earth, but if Russia or China used the same tactics toward Mexico or Canada, one can imagine the caterwauling—and threats of military retaliation—from Washington.

None of this justified Russia’s invasion. Yet one can understand why Putin saw no other solution when Washington refused to negotiate. The allies denounce the “salami slicing” by China in Asian-Pacific waters, but expected Moscow to accept similar tactics by the U.S. and NATO in Ukraine: the allied attempt to create a fait accompli with Ukraine as a de facto Western military ally, through NATO in Ukraine rather than Ukraine in NATO.

Yet, after helping to foment the worst European conflict since the Second World War, none of the allies sent combat troops to defend Ukraine. Observed Daniel DePetris of Defense Priorities, “The Europeans may frame the war as some epic contest between civilization and the forces of darkness, but none of them are willing to deploy their own troops into the fight or the formidable costs such a decision would bring.” For 14 years, NATO members promised Kiev an eventual invitation but refused to provide one. Such assurances continued even more fervently after Russia invaded, but again without an alliance marriage proposal forthcoming. 

At the latest summit the fraudulent promises continue. Much public attention greeted the draft communique’s statement that Ukraine’s path to alliance membership was “irreversible.” However, nothing suggested that the process would speed up. The allies could spend years releasing additional press releases affirming that Kiev’s accession remains irreversible and still do nothing. One explanation for the latest delay is that someone apparently noticed that Ukraine’s government is corrupt, too much so to incorporate into a military alliance, even to thwart the supposed threat to Western civilization. 

In fact, Kiev should be excluded because it is not in America’s or Europe’s security interest to go to war with nuclear-armed Russia over Ukraine. For most of America’s history, Ukraine was ruled from Moscow, which never caused anyone in Washington concern. Putin has shown no interest expanding westward and warned against Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO because he did not want to face a war with the U.S. through the alliance. His difficulties in defeating Kiev would be greatly magnified by an attempt to subjugate the rest of Europe. Indeed, attempting to swallow just Ukraine would weaken Russia by ensuring continuing conflict. The very real danger of the conflict expanding is due to the West recklessly pushing a proxy war toward a full-scale conflict, with dispatch of deadly weapons for use against Russia and allied personnel to aid in the use of those arms against Russia. The allies made the slope toward full-scale war ever more slippery.

Beyond that, of course, the conflict is a great human tragedy, but preventing tragedy is not within NATO’s writ. Moreover, despite its oft-expressed humanitarian pretensions, Washington has allowed multiple international conflicts and civil wars to rage wildly, killing hundreds of thousands or even millions of civilians, with nary another thought. Like Russia, the U.S. has launched illegal wars and underwritten fratricidal conflicts abroad irrespective of the casualties involved. The Biden administration’s determination to fuel the Ukrainian conflict, which Kiev looks unlikely to win, is anything but humane.

Indeed, promising the latter NATO membership would leave Moscow with little incentive to settle the conflict, since continued battle would be the best means to forestall eventual membership. Indeed, Russia would have an incentive to escalate, leaving nothing but death and desolation in its wake. Ukrainians might gain false hope, encouraging them to keep fighting, hopeful that the allies would eventually join the fight. If Kiev nevertheless sought to end the conflict, Moscow could revive the fighting if accession to NATO appeared to become a realistic possibility. 

Nor, ironically, would granting membership after a settlement have the deterrent effect intended. Russia would remember that the allies spent years refusing to bring Kiev in and then refusing to defend Ukraine when it mattered. Why would the allies reverse course if hostilities erupted again? Ukraine would be no more important to Western security tomorrow than it is today or was yesterday.

Although the Russo–Ukrainian war might be the most important current issue for NATO, the future of the alliance also requires attention. Instead of promising to drag America, or at least allow America to be dragged, into another European war, U.S. officials should begin preparing for a European designed and led defense system. The American people are moving in that direction, with almost as many supporting a reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe as in favoring keeping forces there. And after years of wailing and gnashing of teeth, most European members of NATO are spending more on their militaries, with several nations pushing to increase the alliance target for military spending from 2 to 2.5 to even 3 percent of GDP. 

One could imagine NATO led by Europeans with Washington as an associate member, prepared to cooperate when appropriate. Or a continental defense system rooted in the European Union, with which the U.S. would partner when interests warranted. Or some other alliance permutation, based on Europeans taking over responsibility for what obviously matters more to them than America, their own security. Such a shift won’t be easy, but continental attitudes are changing. A third of Western Europeans believe that the U.S. is “somewhat unreliable” in guaranteeing their defense. Popular majorities favor their nations being primarily responsible for their defense, which should be encouraged by Washington. 

Still, resistance from the usual suspects on both sides of the Atlantic remains strong. An unnamed NATO official recently declared, “I already lived through NATO during Trump’s first term. And I really don’t fancy another.” Alliance advocate Michael Peck, upset that a third of Americans want “to end the country’s most important and most successful security relationship,” wrote an article entitled “NATO Must Sell Itself to Americans.” Yet Peck admitted that “The problem isn’t a lack of effort to cement transatlantic ties. There has been no shortage of conferences and think tank reports—even a “NATO Youth Summit”—to discuss European security.” 

Despite the ever-expanding pretensions of global leadership by cloistered and spoiled Washington elites, the U.S. is headed toward domestic crisis. America suffers from a deficient president and divisive challenger; a diverse people increasingly estranged, bitterly sundered by geography, culture, and belief; an aging society ill-prepared for shifting demographic burdens; cities bedeviled by failing infrastructure and violent crime; and an essentially bankrupt government, burdened by hundreds of trillions of dollars in unfunded liabilities. Federal debt continues to rocket upward and could be double America’s GDP by mid-century. It is time to concentrate on confronting our problems at home.

Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is understandable. But the alliance’s purpose is to improve the security of its members, not offer charity to outsiders. Worse, bringing Ukraine into NATO would make conflict with Russia much more likely. Eight decades after World War II the world has changed. American dominance has lessened. Allied capabilities have burgeoned. The Europeans should take over responsibility for their own futures.

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Ramaswamy on a Rift

“Do we, as America First conservatives, really want to be handing rogue agencies like the CFPB more power? The National Libertarian answer is simple: hell no. The right answer isn’t to give the CFPB more power while admonishing it for abusing the power it already has; rather, the right answer is to shut it down.” So said Vivek Ramaswamy in one of the most interesting and substantive speeches at NatCon 2024 in Washington, D.C. It wasn’t a stump speech; rather, it pointed out a substantive difference in policy prescription within the emerging and arguably most powerful segment of the right. 

Ramaswamy’s point is simple. Everyone agrees that the neoliberal consensus has failed. What now? The prescriptions, according to him, range between more government and less government. 

“My goal is to illuminate a brewing intellectual rift between two camps in the America First movement that hasn’t really yet been explored,” he said. “The first is what I call the National Protectionist direction, and the second is what I call the National Libertarian direction. Both reject the old neoliberal consensus on foreign policy, trade, and immigration—but for different reasons, particularly on trade and immigration, and with very different implications for the future direction of the America First movement.”

Per Ramaswamy, in order to tackle the Habsburgian bloat in the government, the answer shouldn’t be adding to the bloat even further, which, at best would create a massive equilibrium in the government bureaucracy, and cult of experts, with continuous power over the working class; and at worst, will see even the new fresh cadres of right-wing bureaucrats co-opted to the cause of the left. For a historical appreciation of this thesis, look no further than the national security bureaucracy expansion under George W. Bush, and where that project ideologically stands now. 

This sets him in sharp contrast to the Josh Hawley and Oren Cass faction of the NatCons: “National Protectionists believe in reshaping and redirecting the regulatory state to advance policies that improve the plight of American workers and manufacturers. By contrast, National Libertarians believe the only way we are going to improve the plight of America, including our workers and manufacturers, isn’t by reinventing the regulatory state; it’ll be by dismantling the regulatory state.” Less Teddy Roosevelt, and more Calvin Coolidge. 

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Pelosi Hints Biden Should Reconsider 2024 Run Amid Growing Concerns

In a recent development, former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi suggested that President Joe Biden might need to rethink his 2024 reelection bid. During an interview on July 2, 2024, Pelosi acknowledged voters’ concerns about Biden’s age and mental fitness, calling these worries “legitimate” and urging both Biden and former President Donald Trump to undergo mental acuity tests​​.

Pelosi’s remarks come amid increasing speculation and anxiety within the Democratic Party following Biden’s underwhelming performance in the first presidential debate. His struggles during the debate, marked by a hoarse voice and moments of confusion, have fueled doubts about his ability to secure a victory against Trump in the upcoming election.

Speaker Pelosi tells me Biden can win

She says she won’t make comments in the hallway about “the fate of our nation”

When I asked if Biden should run she said

“Am I speaking English to you? I’m not going to be making any statements about any of that right now in the hallway..” pic.twitter.com/8R1KsTuTc0

— Rachel Scott (@rachelvscott) July 10, 2024

Pelosi stressed the importance of Biden demonstrating his capabilities through interviews with serious journalists to reassure the public of his competence​​.

Despite defending Biden’s track record and personal integrity, Pelosi’s comments hint at a broader unease among Democrats. The former Speaker emphasized the necessity for transparency and suggested that both presidential candidates should be willing to undergo any necessary tests to prove their fitness for office​​.

Whoever took the parlay of AOC being on team “the matter is closed” and Pelosi being on team “the matter is not quite closed” can collect their winnings. https://t.co/IMuZ9FAGx8

— Philip Klein (@philipaklein) July 10, 2024

This debate over Biden’s candidacy has been amplified by calls from other prominent Democrats and media outlets for him to consider stepping down.

Notably, some Democratic members of Congress and media voices have been vocal about the need for new leadership, fearing that Biden may not be able to effectively challenge Trump in the general election​​.

Pelosi’s cautious approach reflects a strategic concern within the party. While acknowledging Biden’s accomplishments, she also highlighted the need for him to convincingly present his vision, judgment, and knowledge to the American people. Pelosi’s remarks are part of a broader narrative pushing for clarity and confidence in Biden’s leadership as the election season heats up​.

As the political landscape continues to evolve, Pelosi’s statements underscore a critical moment for the Democratic Party. The coming months will likely see increased scrutiny on Biden’s campaign and potential discussions about alternative candidates if his performance does not improve. This internal debate is a testament to the high stakes and intense pressure facing the Democratic leadership as they prepare for a contentious 2024 election​.

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Biden Faces Major Test at NATO Summit

President Joe Biden is set to face a significant diplomatic challenge at the upcoming NATO summit in Washington, D.C., from July 9-11, 2024. This summit marks a crucial moment as it will be the 75th anniversary of the alliance, bringing together 32 allied nations to address pressing global security issues, primarily focusing on the ongoing war in Ukraine and the alliance’s future strategy​​.

Biden’s leadership will be scrutinized as he aims to maintain unity among NATO members while managing divergent views on key issues such as Ukraine’s membership. The summit is expected to highlight NATO’s steadfast support for Ukraine, a stance Biden has championed since Russia’s invasion in February 2022. He plans to use the summit to reinforce the message of unwavering support for Kyiv, arguing that Western aid has been pivotal in Ukraine’s resilience against Russian aggression​​.

Hello! Welcome to Washington, D.C.

Capital of the United States, witness to the founding of NATO 75 years ago, and host of the 2024 #NATOSummit pic.twitter.com/YyB7rlcM8V

— NATO (@NATO) July 9, 2024

One of the major points of contention is Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. While Eastern European members and nations like Poland support Ukraine’s eventual inclusion, key allies such as Germany and the U.S. remain cautious, citing the need for further democratic reforms and military readiness. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently aligned more closely with Eastern European leaders on this issue, adding to the complexity of the discussions​​.

Another significant agenda item will be the formal approval of Sweden’s NATO membership. Although Finland’s accession was finalized earlier, Sweden’s bid has faced objections from Turkey and Hungary. Biden has been actively involved in negotiations to resolve these issues, aiming for a breakthrough during the summit​​.

Zelensky is in Washington for the NATO summit.
Ukraine is not part of NATO (so why is he there).

Children’s hospital attacked. (why was he here).

Russian peace deal on table. Zelensky rejected it. Refuses elections.

How much will this cost?#cdnpoli
pic.twitter.com/gY99Itpycm

— sonofabench (@therealmrbench) July 9, 2024

Additionally, Biden will push for continued NATO support for Ukraine as the conflict enters a critical phase. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to press for more definitive commitments from NATO leaders regarding military aid and a clearer path to membership. This comes against the backdrop of Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, which have seen mixed results so far​​.

Internally, Biden faces challenges from rising skepticism within the U.S., particularly from some congressional Republicans and GOP presidential candidates who question the extent of American financial and military support for Ukraine. This domestic opposition adds pressure on Biden to secure robust international backing for Ukraine at the summit, ensuring that the alliance remains united in its approach to Russian aggression​​.

The summit also provides an opportunity for Biden to reaffirm NATO’s broader strategic goals. This includes addressing the evolving security landscape, bolstering defense capabilities, and ensuring that all member states meet their defense spending commitments. The meeting will be a critical test of Biden’s diplomatic skills and his ability to navigate complex international dynamics while reinforcing the United States’ leadership within the alliance​​.

As the world watches, Biden’s performance at the NATO summit will have far-reaching implications for the alliance’s future and the ongoing efforts to counter Russian threats. His ability to maintain cohesion among NATO members and secure concrete commitments will be crucial in shaping the alliance’s response to current and future challenges.

The post Biden Faces Major Test at NATO Summit appeared first on The Conservative Brief.

GOP Can Learn Abortion Lesson from Methodist Infighting 

GOP Can Learn Abortion Lesson from Methodist Infighting 

Republicans must remain the pro-life party.

Anti-abortion campaigners celebrate outside the US Supreme Court in Washington, DC, on June 24, 2022. (Photo by OLIVIER DOULIERY / AFP) (Photo by OLIVIER DOULIERY/AFP via Getty Images)

Before my United Methodist Church began its final descent into theological madness, disparate elements were trying to drag it left or right on various issues through the denomination’s messy democratic process. Nowhere was this more apparent than on abortion.

The church was an early adopter of the “prayerfully pro-choice” position before Roe v. Wade, but its teachings were gradually revised in a more pro-life direction over time as the more conservative Methodists organized to fight back against leftward drifts. This included opposition to abortion as a form of birth control, recognition of at least potential fetal personhood, and eventually support for banning partial-birth abortion.

Despite this incremental improvement, the Methodist social principles on abortion even at their best were a bit of a muddled mess. Of course, that is true of public opinion about abortion in general and is what you would expect of compromise language written for people with divergent views.

This brings us to the newly revised GOP platform in which the pro-life plank is, if not quite gutted, the most equivocal it has been since 1976, when it truly was a compromise between Republicans on different sides of the abortion debate, after the convention fight between Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan. Ford and Jimmy Carter went into the general election with relatively nuanced positions on abortion by today’s standards, with the parties not really sorting on the issue until Reagan won four years later.

The former President Donald Trump recognizes that Democrats have successfully branded any federal legislation on abortion post-Roe as a “national ban” or “federal ban” on abortion. This is true even when the public supports the details of the actual bill in question, which is a problem because they do oppose a blanket “national ban.”

Trump is eager to avoid this problem. He therefore wishes to avoid federal legislation on the topic and rebrand the Democrats as extremist defenders of late-term abortion. I think Trump is generally correct as a matter of short-term political strategy and that abortion lawmaking cannot be as divorced from public opinion as judicially imposed abortion policy was for nearly 50 years of Roe.

Where Trump goes off the rails is in his conceit that some final Art of the Deal compromise can be reached on abortion. The mixture of federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment makes the abortion plank incoherent, which could be forgiven as a matter of democratic haggling finally allowed by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and also likely to inflame both sides. 

States possess police powers under the Constitution. That is the proper level of government to regulate abortion as a practice that involves the taking of innocent human life. The laws that protect magazine editors and political columnists from homicide are largely enacted at the state level. But, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state legalizing the killing of magazine editors and political columnists would be problematic.

A better approach would be for the Republican platform to explicitly oppose abortion except in cases of rape, incest, and when the mother’s life is in danger without specifying the level of government that should enact this policy. This has been Trump’s formal position on abortion since circa 2016 and that of every Republican presidential nominee since Reagan. 

The plank should take a victory lap on the reversal of Roe, which could also justify the deletion of the human life amendment endorsement. Here you could talk up states getting back the power to legislate abortion.

One problem with this is that the Fourteenth Amendment language was obviously the get for the big pro-life groups, even if it is simultaneously the hook Democrats are using to claim Republicans still support a federal ban on abortion without appeasing grassroots pro-life activists who are demoralized by the platform.

Party platforms are mainly symbolic, but it is still important to avoid the GOP drifting away from being pro-life. Trump’s mifepristone stance, for example, is a troubling substantive rather than strategic concession. But it is also likelier that a Democratic White House and Congress will pass a bill “codifying Roe” that negates many state-level pro-life laws than the same combinations of Republicans getting a 15-week ban across the finish line.

Eventually, most conservatives decided to leave the United Methodist Church and now it is free to let its freak flag fly on abortion. While a church is more important than a political party, that’s hopefully not a window into the Republican future. 

The post GOP Can Learn Abortion Lesson from Methodist Infighting  appeared first on The American Conservative.

French Elections Could Have Been Worse

French Elections Could Have Been Worse

Rassemblement National still has the wind at its back.


Credit: Christian Liewig – Corbis/Corbis via Getty Images

If you are someone who hopes and believes that France will, under some form of right or right-center or centrist government, effectively stop mass Third-World migration and say no to the “Great Replacement,” last Sunday’s election results are not the worst possible news. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party received far and away the most votes, though not what counts: the most elected deputies. The trick of proclaiming the that the Le Pen party is “far-right” and beyond the pale still works in France to a degree; in the second round of voting, candidates from the liberal technocratic Macronists allied with the moderate and far left, standing down and endorsing one another in many districts and keeping the National Rally to about 140 delegates. Polls which had a week ago forecast a substantial National Rally victory—200 delegates, perhaps 250—shifted in the final days. Le Pen’s young protégé, 28-year-old Jordan Bardella, will not be France’s next prime minister. 

For friends of the French right, broadly defined, this may not be the most terrible outcome. It was admittedly a little difficult to imagine Bardella, almost unknown in France two years ago, actually becoming prime minister of France right now. The National Rally ran a handful of candidates who were not ready for prime time, which Bardella acknowledged in his concession speech Sunday night. The issues that have propelled the National Rally to be the first party in France—the combined sense that French elites are out of touch with common people, and that immigration is bit by bit making France unrecognizable to itself—have not been resolved. They certainly won’t be by whatever strange coalition Emmanuel Macron’s still unnamed new prime minister will come up with, which will necessarily include communists, former Trotskyites, more moderate socialists, and militantly Third-World members of La France Insoumise, veteran left-winger Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s party. 

It is almost a given that such a coalition will not be able to govern coherently, and it is not clear what ideological faction will hold sway. Confidence that the “center”—embodied by Emanuel Macron, whose bourgeois technocratic adherents are known by the derisive term la macronie—will obviously prevail in any face-off with their new leftist partners seems unrealistic. The French are weary of Macron; Mélenchon, for all his catering to the extreme Third-Worldist left, still comes across as a traditional French politician, masculine in a way that appeals to both men and women—and that Macron does not. 

One obvious silver lining of the election results is that Macron’s bid to get France more involved in the Ukraine war (he floated the idea of sending French troops there earlier this year) is almost certainly dead for now. His new governing coalition partners include extreme hawks: The socialist leader Raphaël Glucksmann is as war mongering as Tom Cotton, but is in the company of leftists with residual pro-Russia sentiments and NATO skeptics like Mélenchon. The political forces that might support an escalation of the war against Moscow have been weakened. 

As for the future, France does not have a stable and coherent governing majority now, and won’t for a year, which is when the soonest new parliamentary elections can be held. The country will hold together—there is robust and competent civil service—but the prevailing winds that brought the National Rally to the top of the polls blow still. The overall electoral trend for the National Rally in terms of deputies and voter support is overwhelmingly favorable over that of the past 10 years. Whether this points to an eventual National Rally victory, or a still conceivable alliance between a center-right politician and Le Pen’s party—a Sarkozy with some populist force behind him—is unknown, but it could and should happen. Seeing the far left in partial power—a genuinely violent Antifa type actually won in one district, supported by la macronie—makes such a development more likely. 

It is, of course, possible that France could have a realigning election in the other direction, something that signals that the old France is genuinely dead, that a new multicultural post-France is being born. Something like that election of the “moderate” Islamist in Michel Houellebecq’s novel Soumission. But it didn’t happen last Sunday.

The post French Elections Could Have Been Worse appeared first on The American Conservative.

Why ‘America First’ Means Pro-European Union

Why ‘America First’ Means Pro-European Union

The EU is the best bet for American disentanglement from the continent.

Donald Trump hasn’t yet commented on the stunning election results in France, but it’s a good bet he was disappointed that the Rassemblement National underperformed, coming in third place behind the far-left and centrist blocs.. Trump and Marine Le Pen, the face of the right-populist party, have long supported one another. And Euroskeptic leaders outside France also feel an affinity with the 45th president, whose hostility to the European Union and forceful defense of nationalism they admire.

But while Trump and the MAGA Republicans have a natural affinity with European right-populists, the two groups are not, upon closer examination, natural allies. Trump wants the U.S. to start disengaging militarily from Europe, but that’s less likely to happen if the continent is torn apart by petit nationalisme. To convert his America-First rhetoric into reality in a second term, Trump will need Europe to unify as a great power on the world stage—and pro-EU centrists, not anti-EU right-populists, are the ones pushing for unification.

France’s President Emmanuel Macron has led the charge in advancing what he calls “Power Europe,” while European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and outgoing foreign policy chief Josep Borrell have been pushing to turbocharge Europe’s defense industrial capacity. These leaders, widely despised by right-populists the world over, are responding rationally and strategically to global developments. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has made the unthinkable—high-intensity war on the continent—a grim reality again. And with the rise of China and the dawn of multipolarity, Washington’s attention is being diverted away from Europe to the Asia-Pacific.

But the surge of right-populism across Europe could slow, if not reverse, European integration in the security sphere. Reactionary nationalism threatens to hobble the formation of pan-European identity. More prosaically, if right-populists take over the EU, they will return the powers of Brussels to the capitals of member nations, complicating efforts to centralize strategic planning and coordinate weapons procurement. The liberal center is holding, for now, but a sharp right-populist turn would drag Europe toward geopolitical disunity—which is precisely where MAGA Republicans should not want it to go.

Trump supporters who favor a more restrained US foreign policy, or who see China and not Russia as America’s main adversary, say Europe should shoulder a greater defense burden in its region. Senator J.D. Vance (R-OH), a possible Trump running mate, is one of MAGA-world’s most eloquent spokesmen for this view. In an op-ed for the Financial Times entitled “Europe Must Stand on Its Own Two Feet on Defense,” Vance wrote that Europe’s deep cuts in military spending since the Cold War have amounted to “an implied tax on the American people to allow for the security of Europe.” The Ohio senator continued: “The question each European nation needs to ask itself is this: are you prepared to defend yourself? And the question the U.S. must ask is: if our European allies can’t even defend themselves, are they allies, or clients?”

Vance’s perspective follows in an American tradition tracing back to the Founding. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson warned of entangling alliances that outlive their utility. James Monroe, in proclaiming his namesake doctrine, not only warned European powers to cease interference in the western hemisphere but foreswore American involvement in European affairs. The Jacksonian variant of this tradition eschews nation-building and missionary liberalism, opposes wars of choice, but supports decisive force to win wars that are in the national interest. In the 20th century, Pat Buchanan took up the mantle of this very American, realist sub-tradition in his campaigns for president and in books like A Republic, Not an Empire. Vance has been called the “heir” of Buchanan, and Trump’s political rhetoric and instincts, if not his policy record, are Buchananite.

Paradoxically, a neo-Buchananite, Trumpist American foreign policy program dovetails with Macronism, not Le Penism, and for two reasons: First, if a withdrawal of American power from Europe ultimately revitalizes intra-European, nationalistic rivalry, the U.S. may be compelled to resume its presence there to calm tensions. Second, while neither France nor Germany nor Italy can be a great power in the 21st century, Europe can be—and only a great power can safeguard the region from Chinese dominance, Russian intimidation, and American dependency. Macron dreams of a sovereign and united Europe, while his right-populist rivals in France, sensing a threat to national sovereignty, seek to thwart his vision.

Macron has a better relationship with President Joe Biden than with Trump, but realism teaches that, in an anarchic international system, individual leaders and their interpersonal bonds matter less than the distribution of military power. While Macron initially welcomed Biden’s presidency, he’s been disappointed by Biden’s pursuit of anti-China policies that have damaged European interests. Meanwhile, Biden’s embrace of the transatlantic alliance, by reassuring European centrists, has dampened their push to become less dependent on America.

Macron should see Trumpism as a blessing in disguise for Europe. The French President’s controversial aim to extend France’s nuclear umbrella over the continent will attract more support if doubts grow about the reliability of America’s own umbrella. More generally, Trump’s antipathy to NATO helps Macron make the case for European strategic autonomy. Macron will need more than pretty speeches to convince his European compatriots to build a robust security community—he’ll need precisely the structural incentives that a second Trump presidency would make stronger and more salient.

Trump, for his part, instead of mocking Macron and casting the European Union as a “foe,” should praise European integration as being in America’s national interest. And rather than simply disparaging NATO’s over-reliance on America, Trump should offer an alternative vision: a “dormant NATO” that sees EU nations take the lead in Europe while the U.S. waits in the wings, ready to act, if needed, as an offshore balancer.

During the Cold War, Europe relied on the U.S. to contain the Soviet Union. Afterwards, it was content to let the remaining superpower continue subsidizing its defense. Today, amid the rise of China and resurgence of Russia, if Europe doesn’t take responsibility for its own security, either the U.S. will become badly over-stretched or American support will be wrenched away before Europe is ready. 

Trump, not Biden, is pushing Europe to stop being an American protectorate and become a legitimate world power, so that America can devote scarce resources elsewhere. And since European right-populism undermines this project, “America First” means pro–European Union, however paradoxical that may seem.

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