Foreign Affairs
The Russia-Ukraine War Belongs to Russia and Ukraine
Only they, not Donald Trump, can solve it.
After barely six months in office, President Donald Trump has gone from peacemaker to warmonger. He attacked Iran and is threatening more strikes, bombarded Yemen’s Ansar Allah militants on behalf of Israel and Europe, is encouraging the former to conquer Gaza, and is increasing U.S. involvement in the Russia-Ukraine cataclysm.
War with Russia is the most immediate danger. Its invasion of its neighbor was a tragedy, but requires U.S. avoidance, not involvement. Throughout most of America’s history, Ukraine has been ruled from Moscow. The Ukrainian people have long suffered under that relationship, but Washington never considered going to war on Kiev’s behalf. Ukraine matters far more to Europe than America, and, as Trump has admitted, the current conflict was fueled by Washington’s multiple broken promises not to expand NATO to Russia’s borders. U.S. interests would be best served by cutting off fuel for the conflict, with its dangerous potential of escalating into a nuclear confrontation.
Trump has offered no compelling explanation for his stunning volte-face, with his plan to further empty American military arsenals for Kiev and impose additional economic sanctions on Moscow. He has advanced neither the impossible case that American security is at risk nor the implausible claim that Moscow plans to conquer the rest of Europe. What else could justify incurring nuclear risks that he long warned against?
One of his chief hawkish critics, former National Security Council staffer Fiona Hill, has inadvertently detailed how little is at stake for America. She complained that Trump believes the conflict is “just about real estate, about trade and who gets what, be it minerals, land or rare earths” and doesn’t understand that Russian President Vladimir Putin “doesn’t want a ceasefire. [He] wants a neutered Ukraine, not one that is able to withstand military pressure. Everybody sees this, apart from Trump.” That is obviously terrible for Ukrainians, but they are not the first people to live in a bad neighborhood, restrained by powerful neighbors. The situation is not particularly threatening for Europeans who enjoy a far larger combined economy, population, and military budget than Russia, and matters very little militarily, politically, or economically to the U.S.
The closest thing to a justification that Trump has offered is his presumably genuine concern over civilian casualties. He complains that often he’ll have a nice talk with Putin, who then launches “rockets into some city like Kiev and kills a lot of people in a nursing home or whatever. You have bodies lying all over the street.” The casualties are terrible, but Trump’s squeamishness is hypocritical at best. He cares little when his best foreign friends, most notably Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman and Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, do the same. His first administration underwrote Riyadh’s devastating onslaught against Yemeni civilians, about which he made no complaint, and his second administration has backed, with only occasional verbal criticisms, Israel’s mass slaughter of Palestinians. Indeed, Trump has demonstrated little concern over Israel’s costly attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, or Syria, or occupation of the West Bank. Far from attempting to restrain the superior powers most responsible for the human carnage, he has unashamedly underwritten their depredations.
While Ukrainians deserve American sympathy, additional U.S. support for their nation ensures its continued destruction, with only a very limited chance of changing the war’s ultimate outcome. Indeed, if agreed to, Trump’s demand for an immediate ceasefire is more likely to extend than terminate the war. There is no evidence that the Zelensky government has abandoned its unrealistic goals of recovering lost territory, including Crimea. Rather, wily President Volodymyr Zelensky has played Trump, supporting a temporary cessation of hostilities without agreeing to meaningful concessions to Russia. With essentially no work done on the vital task of deciding terms for peace, a ceasefire operates to the advantage of the weaker party, in this case Kiev, which has been steadily losing ground.
Moscow would be extraordinarily foolish to halt hostilities with neither allied restriction on Ukrainian resupply nor Kiev’s agreement on the conflict’s final settlement. Since it has taken Russia more than three years to establish a clearly winning advantage on the battlefield, Putin can ill afford to squander his government’s edge. As one apparent Kremlin insider told the Guardian: “whatever expectations Putin might have had for a good relationship with Trump, it was always going to come second to his maximalist goals in Ukraine. For Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is existential.” Trump, while saying he was “very disappointed” with Moscow, has offered it no commensurate advantage in return, only the threat of “sanctions and maybe tariffs, secondary tariffs.”
However, despite evident economic dislocation and pain, Russia’s economy has withstood Western sanctions and even grown since the war began. There might be tougher times ahead, but they are unlikely to break Putin’s regime. Trump’s threat to punish countries purchasing Russian oil—most importantly China and India, and secondarily Brazil—would damage the U.S., since none of these countries would likely surrender to Washington’s pressure. However, targeting them almost certainly would wreck chances of a trade agreement with Beijing, destroy the improving geopolitical relationship with New Delhi, and exacerbate the ongoing feud with Brasilia.
Indeed, Trump’s apparent willingness to sacrifice so much in an attempt to impose his will in Ukraine—a halt in hostilities with minimal consideration of the parties’ interests or geopolitical result—demonstrates the problem in his diplomatic approach here and elsewhere. What the president appears to care most about is being the decider, rather than assisting the appropriate deciders, the actual participants, who have the most at stake, in reaching a sustainable outcome. The result is a foreign policy that increasingly puts America last, rather than first.
In the Middle East he wants Israel to triumph in any and all cases, irrespective of anyone else’s interest (including, arguably, America’s), hence his demand that Hamas accept a ceasefire with Israel on Netanyahu’s terms, Gaza residents leave so the U.S. can seize and redevelop the territory, Iran accept Israel’s demand to cease nuclear reprocessing, and nations from Sudan to Saudi Arabia to Syria recognize Israel despite its brutal rule over millions of Palestinians. None of these ideas reflect geopolitical reality. Nor do they advance measurable let alone important American interests.
Similar is his approach elsewhere. Trump wants Denmark to transfer Greenland to America and Panama to return the canal to Washington’s control. While his concerns, at least the latter two, are not entirely unreasonable, in every case he has generated more opposition to U.S. policy, when a less confrontational approach would likely have achieved America’s essential ends. Indeed, against all odds he unwittingly helped reelect Canada’s left-wing government. He also aided Australia’s Labor Party in its recent victory and has perversely revived the political fortunes of the very Brazilian administration that he sanctioned for prosecuting the previous president, a right-wing populist and Trump fan.
On Ukraine, at least, Trump still has time to change course. The U.S. should disentangle from the ongoing conflict, ending its proxy war-plus against Russia. That means phasing out military and financial support for Kiev and expanding diplomatic contacts with Moscow to discuss phased normalization of relations as part of a larger peace arrangement. The Trump administration should indicate its willingness to ultimately end sanctions, unfreeze Russian financial assets, and reengage internationally with Moscow.
As for Europe, Washington should reinforce its message that it is shifting responsibility for the continent’s security to NATO’s European members. Required is not just a superficial promise to spend more, with a hope to satisfy the new requirements with pork barrel infrastructure projects, but the ability to replace American military personnel and materiel. As for Ukraine, the Europeans would be free to underwrite Kiev’s continued military efforts, but they would do so without American backing. If they introduce their own troops, it would be at their own risk, with no Article 5 guarantee. And the U.S. would sell weapons destined for Ukraine only if doing so does not denude American arsenals.
While Washington should continue promoting peace negotiations between Moscow and Kiev, Trump should not seek to impose anything on either warring party. Rather, he should set forth America’s position and allow them to adjust their own policies accordingly. As part of this process, the U.S. should encourage other potential interlocutors and mediators, governments not tied to the combatants, to assist. Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, India, and other prominent members of the Global South come to mind. Even countries aligned with Moscow or Kiev but nevertheless desirous of peace—China and Hungary on one side, European nations strongly pro-Ukraine but with popular sentiments shifting against continued war on the other—might press their friends for compromise and resolution.
It is more important to demonstrate patience and seek an agreement that will be sustained by both sides than to demand a temporary halt in combat and superficial commitment to peace. Absent an overwhelming victory by one side, far more likely by Russia than Ukraine, peace terms will not be imposed. Instead, negotiations will be difficult and require both parties to make sometimes unpleasant concessions. One reason for Trump to improve U.S. relations with Moscow is to remind the latter that it has much to gain from cooperating with the West, reentering global markets, and reducing dependence on China.
The Ukrainian and Russian people alike need peace. That requires learning from the past. Vladimir Putin is responsible for starting the war with Ukraine that will leave his country bloodied and isolated. Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky abandoned the peace platform upon which he was elected and underestimated the danger of Russian intervention. His nation now faces years of painful recovery.
The benefits of peace would go far beyond the formal combatants. Allied leaders are responsible for recklessly flouting Moscow’s security concerns, misleading Ukraine about their support, and refusing to negotiate with Russia before its invasion. As a result, European peoples, and especially Ukrainians, have paid a terrible price. Washington’s provocative proxy war-plus has increased the risks of confrontation with a nuclear peer and pushed that country toward America’s greatest geopolitical rival, China. The result is a much more dangerous future, one that could end in a disastrous conflagration in Asia, with catastrophic global consequences.
Trump is understandably frustrated at his failure to end Europe’s latest conflict. His desperate hopes for a Nobel Peace Prize are fading if not already dashed. However, seeking to promote agreement by Ukraine and Russia, rather than impose his preferred terms on them, is the best strategy to reverse his fortunes. He should act now to repair a foreign policy reputation that looks increasingly belligerent.
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