Among Hungary’s Weird Nomad Nationalists

Among Hungary’s Weird Nomad Nationalists

A dispatch from the “Meeting of the Tribes.”

Europe's largest festival 'Kurultaj Festival' continues in Hungary
(Ilkin Eskipehlivan/Anadolu via Getty Images)

In late summer, the drive south from Budapest has an ominous, apocalyptic feel. As suburbs give way to the flat expanse of the Hungarian countryside, the landscape turns brown and yellow, broken only by a few dull streaks of green. On the outskirts of the city, a billboard looms against the skyline. It’s for a Hungarian rapper who calls himself Pogány Induló—“Pagan March.”

The billboard is an appropriate marker for a journey to the Kurultáj, a self-styled gathering of nomadic tribes that happens every year on the plains of south-central Hungary. Would-be khans, warlords, merchants, and others from across the Eurasian steppe converge on the small town of Bugac for a multi-day event that is something between a renaissance fair, a steppe encampment, and a caravanserai. To liberal Hungarians, it all seems a gigantic LARP—live-action role-playing game—with dashes of pseudoscience and right-wing nationalism thrown in for good measure. 

But as you approach the festival grounds, you’d be forgiven for thinking you’ve traveled back in time. First you’re stuck behind cars, then tractors, then horse-drawn wagons. Then you are caught in a stream of people, many on horseback or wearing leather and cotton tunics, chain mail hauberks, and elaborate steppe headgear. You hear the festival before you actually see it—loud cracks rise above the din of conversation as attendees test thick leather bullwhips, a traditional accoutrement for Hungarian herdsmen and bandits. 

The spiritual and geographic antithesis of the Kurultáj is Sziget, another festival that takes place every August on a Danube island just north of Budapest. Sziget advertises itself as “the Island of Freedom” and attracts pop stars, rock bands, DJs, and hundreds of thousands of festivalgoers from across the globe. For many younger Hungarians, Sziget is the much-anticipated climax of their summer.

The crowd at the Kurultáj is something else entirely. There are plenty of Hungarians, yes, but also Turks, Turkmens, Azeris, Kazakhs, Mongols, and other, more exotic ethnicities from across the length and breadth of Central Asia. The festival bills itself as a gathering of steppe peoples, and many Hungarian attendees consider themselves the westernmost branch of this family of nations. Even the on-site accommodations have a nomadic flavor: Whereas Sziget festivalgoers favor repurposed camping gear, Kurultáj attendees get free space if they bring their own yurt. The only things the two events have in common are lung-choking amounts of dust and the condition of their respective port-a-potties. (After two days of enduring the smell, you understand why nomads kept moving.) 

The entrance to this year’s Kurultáj was appropriately dramatic. Red runic banners flew from two parallel rows of flagpoles that channeled visitors towards the grand arena, a venue for horsemanship, archery, and other feats of nomadic derring-do. The space beyond the arena was filled with tents, benches, stalls, yurts, a music stage, and two domed stucco towers that evoked Samarkand or Tashkent. Fluttering above the arena was a massive banner of Attila the Hun, the patron saint of the Kurultáj, and a smaller banner of Árpád, the quasi-mythic chieftain who led the Hungarian tribes into the Carpathian Basin in the late 9th century. Curiously, the third most popular historical figure seemed to be Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey. Although he did not rate an official banner, his face adorned flags and posters outside many attendees’ tents. 

Heat shimmered over the grand arena and great plumes of dust rose with the ebb and flow of the crowds, but the costume-clad performers were nothing if not committed. During an archery competition on the second day of the festival, a young woman in a long leather and wool tunic had to be carried out of the arena by paramedics. 

Other performers were tougher, or perhaps more accustomed to the conditions. The second day featured a variety of performances on horseback, including mounted archery and an elaborately staged steppe wedding. After the ceremonies concluded, spectators were treated to a game of Kokpar, a Kazakh version of polo. As a concession to modern sensibilities, the traditional goat carcass used for scoring was replaced by a goat-shaped leather sack, but this did not dim the players’ competitive spirit. Several riders were unhorsed in the scrum and many a nasty red welt was evident on bared arms and backs from all the whipping. 

After several games of Kokpar, it was time for the Hungarians to show their mettle. Native horsemen shot arrows and threw lances at a target dragged from horseback. Other riders performed daring acrobatic feats at the gallop, including standing on horseback, holding themselves perpendicular across their horses’ saddles, and dismounting to run alongside their steeds. 

To some Hungarians, these feats of horsemanship suggest a deeper connection between the peoples whose ancestors once wandered the steppes. Indeed, this is one of the Kurultáj’s foundational ideas. Between wrestling, archery, and horsemanship demonstrations, festivalgoers absorbed presentations from Hungarian, Turkish, and Central Asian academics on their shared ethnic and linguistic heritage. The festival’s regnant ideology, known as Turanism, holds that Hungarians, Turks, Mongols, and a few other scattered ethnic groups share a deep kinship based on their common steppe ancestry. It is well outside the academic mainstream, but the very disreputability of the theory, the idea that it represents outlaw or suppressed knowledge, seemed to enhance its appeal. 

Devotees of this obscure idea were easy to find during the festival. Attendance at a dry talk from an Azerbaijani academic painstakingly translated into Hungarian might be explained by the availability of shade and seating inside the tent, but other, less-credentialed festivalgoers were also eager to discuss nomadic kinship to anyone who would listen. 

A rosy-cheeked attendee from the Székely people, a Hungarian-speaking minority in Romania, had adorned his tent with the flags of what he called “brother nations.” His collection included banners from countries as diverse as Hungary, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Japan, and Korea—all members in good standing, he told me, of the Turanic club. 

My new Székely friend was an enthusiastic proponent of his own people winning independence from Romania, although he declined to specify how this might happen. When I told him I was from Washington, D.C., he assumed I meant Washington State and immediately asked if I supported Cascadia, the movement for an independent Pacific Northwest.   

The most articulate defender of Turanism I met was a 16-year-old named Nimrod, a Hungarian from northern Serbia who sported a new bullwhip wrapped around his shoulder. A self-taught linguist, Nimrod told me about the connection between Hungarian and the Turkic language family. In fluent English, he explained that he had found thousands of Turkish loanwords in Hungarian—definitive proof, he said, of the two languages’ kinship. His next project is learning Kazakh so he can visit his distant relatives in Central Asia.

Nimrod’s enthusiasm for the Turanic thesis was shared by many festivalgoers. From China’s Uyghurs to the Hungarian-speaking minorities of the Balkans, Kurultáj attendees often came from diaspora communities and persecuted ethnic groups. For these festivalgoers, the gathering of tribes is more than history-themed entertainment; it’s an opportunity to belong to a larger club. One couple I ran into was a particularly striking pairing: a pale Asiatic woman from the Karakalpak minority of Uzbekistan and a red-bearded member of Turkey’s Crimean Tatars, a group that originally hailed from the Ukrainian steppe.   

Not all of the attendees were as friendly as Nimrod. A young man named Malik overheard me speaking English and insisted I couldn’t be an American because, in his words, “there’s no such thing.” My features, he continued, were clearly Germanic, something he was familiar with because his family has lived in Germany for decades. But he does not consider himself German, Malik was quick to add. He had come to the Kurultáj to reconnect with his authentically Turkish roots. 

Is there truth to the Turanic thesis? More than English or even Hungarian, Turkish was the lingua franca of the Kurultáj. Even today, the Turkic languages that stretch from Central Asia to the Hellespont are mutually intelligible to varying degrees. Most academics, however, reject the idea that Mongolian, Turkish, and the famously weird Hungarian language are part of the same family. Even some festival attendees were skeptical of this extravagant claim. Aslihan Abdikoğlu, a half-Turkish, half-Hungarian Kurultáj organizer who switched effortlessly between the two languages and English, laughingly told me she couldn’t hear a connection. 

Perceptions of the Kurultáj in Hungary vary widely and often depend on your political sympathies. If you’re on the left, you’re likely to dismiss the event as a pseudoscientific nationalist project or simply a waste of money. Now that Viktor Orbán and the conservative Fidesz Party have lost power, the festival’s government funding is suddenly in jeopardy. Abdikoğlu told me she isn’t sure whether the new government will continue to support the festival, though she believes that there’s enough organic enthusiasm from attendees and participants to keep the Kurultáj going. 

It’s not clear whether Orbán and Fidesz actually bought into the Turanic thesis or merely saw the festival as a way to enhance Hungarian influence in Central Asia and the Near East. After lecturing me on my Germanic features, Malik suggested I look up János Csák, the former Hungarian minister for culture and innovation. Sure enough, Csák was an outspoken proponent of Turanism, proclaiming publicly, “We Hungarians see ourselves as a Turkic nation coming from Central Asia, even from the east of Central Asia.” His enthusiasm for Turanism extended to theorizing about a connection between Hungarian folk music and Korean K-pop. 

Orbán and other Fidesz higher-ups were more circumspect about these ideas, speaking instead of an “Eastern Opening” in Hungarian foreign policy. This approach was quite a departure from older notions of Hungary’s place in the world. In 1989, a youthful, fiery Orbán publicly accused the ruling Communist Party of leading the country into an “Asiatic dead end.” By the end of his tenure as prime minister, he was enthusiastically courting Turkey and the nations of Central Asia. 

Back at the actual festival, many Hungarian attendees wore T-shirts with patriotic and nationalistic slogans and clearly reveled in their nomad heritage. The atmosphere, however, was generally relaxed and friendly, more akin to a theme park than a political rally. Many young families were drawn by the free admission—festivalgoers only pay for parking and a camping spot (unless, of course, they’ve brought their own yurts)—as well as the elaborate historical costumes and feats of horsemanship. I did see one festivalgoer walking around in a “Brotherhood of White Nations” tank top. It seemed a strange fit at an event with so many conspicuously Asian and Middle Eastern attendees. 

The most obvious national agenda on display was not Hungarian, but Turkish—little wonder, perhaps, as Turanism was the quasi-official ideology of the early Republic of Turkey. A department of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism had set up a large tent at the center of the festival documenting Ankara’s infrastructure and developmental projects in places as varied as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. According to the exhibition, even Hungary had received a bit of funding. As the leading Turkic state and a formidable regional power, Ankara is still using the ideology of Turanism to amplify its already considerable influence. 

Other, unofficial expressions of Turkish nationalism were also easy to find. Many attendees wore T-shirts or carried flags of the Grey Wolves, an ultra-nationalist group that some governments and courts have labeled a terror organization. (The group’s most infamous member was Mehmet Ali Ağca, who tried to assassinate Pope John Paul II in 1981.) A festivalgoer carrying a Grey Wolves banner sheepishly explained to me in broken English that the symbol was linked to Turkish nationalism before hurriedly excusing himself. Later, a Turkish videographer showed me how to make the Grey Wolf hand sign. Following a particularly spirited musical performance on the festival’s second day, a performer led the crowd in a Grey Wolf howl, although it’s doubtful that the Hungarians in the audience knew what the call meant. After two days of overhearing Turkish conversations, wolf howls, and seeing Atatürk and Grey Wolf flags, I was inclined to think that the Kurultáj was more of a coup for Ankara’s soft power aspirations than for those of Hungary.     

On the third and final day of the festival, I got to meet some of the performers. Outside the press tent, three young men were dressed in furry black hats and striking blue tunics that stretched down to their black leather boots. The outfits were terrifically unsuited for the sweltering heat, but the men, who turned out to be Dagestani dancers, were preparing to go on stage. 

The Dagestanis were another curious addition to the festival’s roster of performers. Dagestan, a region in the Caucasus Mountains of Russia, is home to dozens of languages and ethnic groups. It is, according to Abdul, the lead Dagestani performer, “a real melting pot,” although the Dagestani language family is considered separate from its Turkic neighbors. At the Kurultáj, however, none of this matters. Everyone from the steppes (or their borderlands) can be part of the Turanic brotherhood.

Abdul introduced his two fellow dancers, Murat and Islam, and proceeded to explain their elaborate costumes. His silver ceremonial dagger was called a “kindjal,” a term I already knew because Frank Herbert borrowed it for the Dune books (Dagestan’s international footprint comes down to two things: Dune and top-tier MMA fighters). The silver cylinders that stretched across his chest, he continued, were bandoliers that traditionally stored gunpowder and shot. The scorching conditions, Abdul said, could be an issue when dancing. This is his third Kurultáj, and four years ago, he passed out from the heat. “Now I’m tougher,” he added with a grin. 

Despite the dust and the heat, the Dagestani dancers put on a tremendous show, whirling, clapping, and tossing daggers to the thump of accompanying folk music. At the climax of their performance, Abdul and company jumped down from the stage and started dancing in the crowd, inviting bystanders to join in the performance. Several young women eagerly complied, but even the Dagestanis seemed taken aback when a man in a steel helmet and scale armor joined the fray and started swinging his sabre to the music. Mercifully, the performance ended before anyone lost a limb.   

It is tempting to lump the Kurultáj in with the nationalistic upheavals that have fractured European politics in recent years, a return to the old gods in the face of technological change, cultural upheaval, and encroaching Western liberalism. In truth, the gathering of the clans is much weirder and harder to categorize. Instead of a tightly regimented nationalist rally, the event turned out to be a curious mixture of genuine historical enthusiasm, family-friendly entertainment, government propaganda, and several strange and sometimes conflicting ideological, political, and national agendas.

This heady blend is quite different from traditional Hungarian nationalism, which tends to celebrate the uniqueness of the Hungarian language and emphasize Hungary’s historic links to the West. In this account, the Turks are not friends but enemies, foreign invaders whose prolonged occupation of Hungary deprived the country of its rightful place in Europe. (The lengthy Ottoman occupation is also a likely source for the Hungarian language’s many Turkish loanwords.)

The trappings of traditional Hungarian nationalism were easier to find in Izsák, the small town where I stayed overnight during the festival. Despite its modest size, Izsák has monuments to Sándor Petőfi, the hero poet of the Revolution of 1848, and to the anti-Soviet uprising of 1956. Similar shrines can be found in towns and villages across the country. These are legacies of an older project of nation-building, the stuff of textbooks, patriotic pamphlets, and national anthems. They emerged from a 19th- and 20th-century information landscape that was much more centralized and easily channeled, an era of mass public education, propaganda, national newspapers, and state TV and radio stations. 

The Kurultáj, however, is very much a 21st-century phenomenon. The curious blend of fringe academic ideas, alternate histories, niche hobbies, and government propaganda (both open and covert) brought to mind an internet message board, or perhaps the bowels of social media. Here the Turks, Hungary’s traditional enemy, have been reimagined as a “brother nation,” or maybe a vehicle for extending Hungarian influence to the East. Instead of looking to Western Europe or the United States, festivalgoers sought out their Central Asian “kin” and celebrated their shared nomadic heritage. 

The festival’s veneration of steppe ancestors, the peddlers selling animistic totems, and the ubiquitous pagan iconography also implied a spiritual longing that goes beyond academic interest in the distant past. Christianity and Christian symbolism, usually easy to find in Hungary, were almost entirely absent from the Kurultáj. Instead, festivalgoers sought meaning in an ancient family of proud nomad nations, a steppe brotherhood stretching from Siberia to the Great Hungarian Plain. From their musical preferences to their costumes, the shamans, folk dancers, and Hungarian cowboys of the Kurultáj don’t have much in common with the flower children of Sziget, but both groups revel in the ecstatic release of the crowd, the sense of being a part of a larger entity, and a certain pagan sensibility. Pogány Induló, I’m told, delivered an energetic performance at Sziget 2026. Next year, he should consider putting in an appearance at the Kurultáj.

The post Among Hungary’s Weird Nomad Nationalists appeared first on The American Conservative.

Italy and Albania: Communist Students, Antagonist Collectives, and the Flamingo Revolution

Across Europe, the protests are largely backed by left-wing groups. Albania is a special case, as the rioters are opposing a left-wing government. Photo courtesy of RAI TG1 via screengrab.

As France’s high school revolt peaked in October, Italy and Albania saw some of the worst violence outside France. In Italy, communist student groups modeled their actions on France, while militant far-left collectives took over cost-of-living marches. In Albania, a left-wing party leader joined the front lines of a revolt against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist government.

School occupations began in Turin on October 5 under the slogan “Let’s do as in France.” OSA (Opposizione Studentesca d’Alternativa, or Alternative Student Opposition), a communist high school organization, launched the occupations and called for “permanent” mobilization. OSA and its university counterpart, Cambiare Rotta (Change Course), a self-described communist youth organization, occupied schools in Turin and designated October 16 a national day of mobilization.

The conservative Italian daily Il Giornale describes them as youth organizations of Potere al Popolo (Power to the People) and the Rete dei Comunisti (Network of Communists), and frequent organizers of protests ending in clashes with police. Potere al Popolo, a far-left party founded as an electoral list in 2017, won 1.13 percent in the 2018 national election. Il Giornale calls it one of Italy’s last communist parties. The Rete dei Comunisti is a Marxist-Leninist network founded in Bologna in 1998.

On October 16, OSA’s “No Meloni Day” brought students into 40 cities, with clashes in Turin and Bologna. An OSA representative cited the mobilizations in France and Europe as the model. About 700 students marched in Bari, where participants said they were building toward an October 30 general strike called by USB (Unione Sindacale di Base, or Grassroots Union), a militant rank-and-file union.

On October 17, CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, or Italian General Confederation of Labour), the country’s largest labor confederation, held a national march in Rome with more than 100 associations in the La Via Maestra (The Main Road) alliance. Its Tuscan branch includes Arci and Anpi. Arci (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana, or Italian Recreational and Cultural Association) is a left-leaning network of social clubs. Anpi (Associazione Nazionale Partigiani d’Italia, or National Association of Italian Partisans) represents the World War II anti-fascist resistance and its successors.

That day, cost-of-living marches called by Italia in Piazza (Italy in the Square), a social-media initiative describing itself as apolitical, turned violent in several cities. In Bologna, Carrelli Vuoti (Empty Shopping Carts) called the march with three local far-left groups: Cua, Crash, and Plat.

Cua stands for Collettivo Universitario Autonomo (Autonomous University Collective). In Italy, autonomous collectives are far-left groups independent of parties and unions, run by open assemblies, and favoring direct action such as occupations and unauthorized marches. On October 6, Cua led a Bologna march in solidarity with the French protests.

Laboratorio Crash (Crash Laboratory) is a self-managed social center whose earlier occupied buildings in Bologna were cleared by authorities. The city later assigned it the former municipal dairy building. A councilor from Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party, now demands that the allocation be revoked. Plat, the Piattaforma di Intervento Sociale (Social Intervention Platform), was formed in 2020 by Crash, the radical union SI Cobas, and other groups to campaign on wages, housing, and climate.

Cua and Plat activists led an unauthorized march of about 500 people. The clashes injured 75 police officers; 5 people were arrested, including 4 minors.

In Turin, Italy’s national news agency ANSA reported that antagonist collectives, social centers, and the pro-Palestinian milieu took control of the march. Antagonist collectives are militant far-left groups opposed to the state and established parties. Social centers, often occupied buildings, serve as their political and cultural hubs. The pro-Palestinian milieu is the loose network of activist groups organizing pro-Palestinian street protests in Italy.

In Milan, ANSA reported that those attacking police were youths from outlying neighborhoods, some waving Albanian flags in support of the Tirana revolt. They were not black bloc, the masked militants who move together to attack police and property. Police described hundreds of youths from those neighborhoods and other provinces moving in small groups without recognizable coordination. Nationwide, 197 people were identified, 28 arrested, and 141 officers injured. An Italia in Piazza organizer accused antagonist groups of taking over the march.

Violence resumed in Milan on Sunday, October 18. Several hundred hooded protesters burned trash bins and looted Decathlon, Arc’teryx, and Vodafone stores. Police took 271 young people to police stations and arrested 32, including 23 minors and 13 foreign nationals. Another 28 were referred to judicial authorities. Meloni condemned the violence and called a government meeting.

In Albania, the protests grew from the months-long Flamingo Revolution, named for the flamingos of the protected Vjosa-Narta wetland. The movement opposed luxury tourism development there and on Sazan Island linked to Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law. Protests turned violent on October 13, when students threw bricks at the Education Ministry, and police responded with tear gas.

Protesters attacked more than eight public institutions, including the Prime Minister’s Office, Constitutional Court, and Bank of Albania, with stones, flares, and Molotov cocktails. By October 17, police chief Skënder Hita reported 167 arrests and 132 officers injured over five days.

Arlind Qori, leader of Lëvizja Bashkë (Together Movement), has attended the protests. Founded in 2022, the left-socialist party won one seat in the 140-member parliament in 2025, when Rama’s Socialist Party won 83. On October 13, Qori called on Albanians to rise with students. The next day, on a program of the Albanian daily Koha Jonë, he said the movement would bring down Rama “by any means”. On October 18, he told officers that most police side with the people in a revolution.

The Albanian revolt is not solely left-wing. The conservative Democratic Party, the main opposition with 50 seats, led by former Prime Minister Sali Berisha, also backs the students’ demands. Rama blamed the opposition for the violence. Hita said very few detainees were students and attributed the violence to individuals from Albania and abroad, without providing details.

Albanian flags on Milan’s streets showed support for the Tirana revolt. Organized left-wing groups were active in both countries: communist students and far-left collectives organized Italian marches, while Qori joined Albania’s protests and urged wider participation. Their involvement, however, does not establish who directed all the violence. Milan police described youths moving without recognizable coordination. Albania’s police chief said few detainees were students.

The post Italy and Albania: Communist Students, Antagonist Collectives, and the Flamingo Revolution appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

Why is Latin America Swinging to the Right?

Why is Latin America Swinging to the Right?

The Western Hemisphere’s rightward turn has more to do with thermostatic politics than the demise of USAID.

BRAZIL-ELECTION-RUNOFF-CAMPAIGN
Photo by Miguel SCHINCARIOL / AFP via Getty Images

With the apparently imminent triumph of Flávio Bolsonaro in the Brazilian presidential runoff, the Latin American right is reaching heights not seen for decades. One by one, the bulwarks of leftism in the region have fallen: the Peronists of Argentina to Javier Milei, Evo Morales’ Bolivian socialists to Rodrigo Paz, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela to American special forces wielding deadly discombobulators, Gabriel Boric of Chile to José Antonio Kast, Colombia’s Gustavo Petro to Abelardo de la Espriella, and now, it seems, Lula da Silva to Bolsonaro. The last major bastion of the Latin American left is Mexico, where President Claudia Sheinbaum has shown little appetite for defying the United States. A smattering of minor powers rounds out the pathetic list of the region’s remaining left-wing governments: Nicaragua, Belize, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Cuba.

What explains this rout of the Latin American left, which only a few years ago seemed almost invincible? Some commentators on the right have suggested that the Trump administration has facilitated the turn, pointing, for example, to the dismantling of USAID, which they say funneled American foreign aid to left-wing causes and organizations. The White House’s efforts to rein in foreign aid distribution, however, while useful in their own right, are probably not a significant contributor to the political wave sweeping Latin America. The real reasons for the shift are more structural in nature; as such, they are both more prosaic and more profound.

This is far from the first time right-wing governments have swept the Western Hemisphere. In 2000, Latin America was governed predominantly by conservative parties. Vicente Fox’s National Action Party had broken the death grip of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, bringing an end to the “perfect dictatorship”; Alberto Fujimori was blundering through his final days as president-turned-dictator-turned-president-again in Peru; Hugo Banzer, once the military dictator of Bolivia, had returned to govern the country again, this time as a democratically elected president; and Fernando Cardoso was enjoying his second term as president of Brazil, having been reelected two years prior to great popular acclaim (in the process crushing a much younger Lula da Silva, his principal rival). Even the minor Latin American countries, from Costa Rica to Uruguay, were nearly all controlled by some flavor of conservative.

The George W. Bush administration hoped to capitalize on this to remake the hemisphere. “Should I become president, I will look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency,” Bush pledged during the 2000 campaign season, and his administration poured billions into Colombia and Mexico in a mostly unsuccessful attempt to smash the cartels and end the flow of drugs into the United States. But the Latin American prosperity the Bush White House hoped would come from right-wingers liberalizing their economies and embracing democracy never really materialized.

In fact, conservative dominance of Latin America at the turn of the century proved short-lived. Disillusioned voters turned back to the left, hoping that socialist economic policies might provide more concrete improvements to their quality of life. By 2008, the region had been swallowed up by the “pink tide,” a current that carried into power a generation of left-wing icons: Lula in Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. 

Like democratic systems everywhere, Latin American politics is largely thermostatic: Voters grow frustrated with the government in power as it generates grievances, accumulates failures, and becomes associated with the political irritants of the day. Eventually, the popular backlash becomes strong enough that no policy program or charismatic leader can overcome it, and voters throw out the incumbents. The alternative does not even need to be particularly attractive—opposition parties with poor track records in government are frequently the beneficiaries of this trend, because voters have short memories and prefer parties whose great offenses they have forgotten to those whose offenses, though lesser, are daily paraded in front of them.

And Latin American political movements have plenty of opportunities to aggrieve their voters. The promised economic boom is always just around the corner, but never arrives; the politicians who yesterday denounced the graft of their predecessors are today outed for having secret mansions in Miami and hidden bank accounts in the Bahamas. Javier Milei was catapulted to an unanticipated victory in 2023 by savaging the Argentine political class for its corruption and self-dealing; now he is confronting his own corruption scandals.

In other words, though it may be true that “the left hasn’t won a single presidential election in Latin America” since we gutted USAID, it would be foolish to expect the trend to last. Indeed, whether the Trump administration’s destruction of the agency has any relation to this shift remains an open question—political slush funds and patronage from the U.S. have frequently aided the global left, but elections can be surprisingly hard to buy.

Apart from the general thermostatic trends, the Latin American right has benefited from other, more significant tailwinds than the abolition of USAID. South American countries have recently begun to experience their own illegal immigration crisis, driven almost entirely by Venezuelans fleeing the collapsing economy of the Maduro regime. Stopping mass migration and securing national borders, previously issues that barely registered with the public, have become major priorities, creating a political environment that played directly into the hands of the right (which has always been the champion of law and order). This issue may, ironically, soon fade away thanks to the Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela.

Another significant boost to the image and prestige of the Latin American right is the performance of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Many a would-be caudillo has promised to bring down the mano dura (“iron fist”) and restore order and security to a broken society; Bukele has actually delivered. The transformation of El Salvador—from the most dangerous country in the hemisphere to a place that is by many metrics safer than the United States—is a more convincing pitch for Latin American right-wingers than any campaign speech or ad could be.

HED: Why is Latin America Swinging to the Right?

DEK: The Western Hemisphere’s rightward turn has more to do with thermostatic politics than the demise of USAID.

With the apparently imminent triumph of Flávio Bolsonaro in the Brazilian presidential runoff, the Latin American right is reaching heights not seen for decades. One by one, the bulwarks of leftism in the region have fallen: the Peronists of Argentina to Javier Milei, Evo Morales’ Bolivian socialists to Rodrigo Paz, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela to American special forces wielding deadly discombobulators, Gabriel Boric of Chile to José Antonio Kast, Colombia’s Gustavo Petro to Abelardo de la Espriella, and now, it seems, Lula da Silva to Bolsonaro. The last major bastion of the Latin American left is Mexico, where President Claudia Sheinbaum has shown little appetite for defying the United States of America. A smattering of minor powers rounds out the pathetic list of the region’s remaining left-wing governments: Nicaragua, Belize, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Cuba.

What explains this rout of the Latin American left, which only a few years ago seemed almost invincible? Some commentators on the right have suggested that the Trump administration has facilitated the turn, pointing, for example, to the dismantling of USAID, which they say funneled American foreign aid to left-wing causes and organizations. The White House’s efforts to rein in foreign aid distribution, however, while useful in their own right, are probably not a significant contributor to the political wave sweeping Latin America. The real reasons for the shift are more structural; as such, they are both more prosaic and more profound.

This is far from the first time right-wing governments have swept the Western Hemisphere. In 2000, Latin America was governed predominantly by conservative parties. Vicente Fox’s National Action Party had broken the death grip of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, bringing an end to the “perfect dictatorship”; Alberto Fujimori was blundering through his final days as president-turned-dictator-turned-president-again in Peru; Hugo Banzer, once the military dictator of Bolivia, had returned to govern the country again, this time as a democratically elected president; and Fernando Cardoso was enjoying his second term as president of Brazil, having been reelected two years prior to great popular acclaim (in the process crushing a much younger Lula da Silva, his principal rival). Even the minor Latin American countries, from Costa Rica to Uruguay, were nearly all controlled by some flavor of conservative.

The George W. Bush administration hoped to capitalize on this to remake the hemisphere. “Should I become president, I will look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency,” Bush pledged during the 2000 campaign season, and his administration poured billions into Colombia and Mexico in a mostly unsuccessful attempt to smash the cartels and end the flow of drugs into the United States. But the Latin American prosperity the Bush White House hoped would come from right-wingers liberalizing their economies and embracing democracy never really materialized.

In fact, conservative dominance of Latin America at the turn of the century proved short-lived. Disillusioned voters turned back to the left, hoping that socialist economic policies might provide more concrete improvements to their quality of life. By 2008, the region had been swallowed up by the “pink tide,” a current that carried into power a generation of left-wing icons: Lula in Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. 

Like democratic systems everywhere, Latin American politics is largely thermostatic: Voters grow frustrated with the government in power as it generates grievances, accumulates failures, and becomes associated with the political irritants of the day. Eventually, the popular backlash becomes strong enough that no policy program or charismatic leader can overcome it, and voters throw out the incumbents. The alternative does not even need to be particularly attractive—opposition parties with poor track records in government are frequently the beneficiaries of this trend, because voters have short memories and prefer parties whose great offenses they have forgotten to those whose offenses, though lesser, are daily paraded in front of them.

And Latin American political movements have plenty of opportunities to aggrieve their voters. The promised economic boom is always just around the corner, but never arrives; the politicians who yesterday denounced the graft of their predecessors today are outed for having secret mansions in Miami and hidden bank accounts in the Bahamas. Javier Milei was catapulted to an unanticipated victory in 2023 by savaging the Argentine political class for its corruption and self-dealing; now he is confronting his own corruption scandals.

In other words, though it may be true that “the left hasn’t won a single presidential election in Latin America” since we gutted USAID, it would be foolish to expect the trend to last. Indeed, whether the Trump administration’s destruction of the agency has any relation to this shift remains an open question—political slush funds and patronage from the U.S. have frequently aided the global left, but elections can be surprisingly hard to buy.

Apart from the general thermostatic trends, the Latin American right has benefited from other, more significant tailwinds than the abolition of USAID. South American countries have recently begun to experience their own illegal immigration crisis, driven almost entirely by Venezuelans fleeing the collapsing economy of the Maduro regime. Stopping mass migration and securing national borders, previously issues that barely registered with the public, have become major priorities, creating a political environment that played directly into the hands of the right (which has always been the champion of law and order). This issue may, ironically, soon fade away thanks to the Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela.

Another significant boost to the image and prestige of the Latin American right is the performance of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Many a would-be caudillo has promised to bring down the mano dura (“iron fist”) and restore order and security to a broken society; Bukele has actually delivered. The transformation of El Salvador—from the most dangerous country in the hemisphere to a place that is by many metrics safer than the United States—is a more convincing pitch for Latin American right-wingers than any campaign speech or ad could be.

Delivering the kind of transformation that Bukele has accomplished is a tall order for any government—and, indeed, may not be possible outside of the unique circumstances of El Salvador. But for the Latin American right-wing wave to last, that is what they will need to deliver. Otherwise, expect yet another pink tide in 2030.HED: Why is Latin America Swinging to the Right?

DEK: The Western Hemisphere’s rightward turn has more to do with thermostatic politics than the demise of USAID.

With the apparently imminent triumph of Flávio Bolsonaro in the Brazilian presidential runoff, the Latin American right is reaching heights not seen for decades. One by one, the bulwarks of leftism in the region have fallen: the Peronists of Argentina to Javier Milei, Evo Morales’ Bolivian socialists to Rodrigo Paz, Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela to American special forces wielding deadly discombobulators, Gabriel Boric of Chile to José Antonio Kast, Colombia’s Gustavo Petro to Abelardo de la Espriella, and now, it seems, Lula da Silva to Bolsonaro. The last major bastion of the Latin American left is Mexico, where President Claudia Sheinbaum has shown little appetite for defying the United States of America. A smattering of minor powers rounds out the pathetic list of the region’s remaining left-wing governments: Nicaragua, Belize, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Cuba.

What explains this rout of the Latin American left, which only a few years ago seemed almost invincible? Some commentators on the right have suggested that the Trump administration has facilitated the turn, pointing, for example, to the dismantling of USAID, which they say funneled American foreign aid to left-wing causes and organizations. The White House’s efforts to rein in foreign aid distribution, however, while useful in their own right, are probably not a significant contributor to the political wave sweeping Latin America. The real reasons for the shift are more structural; as such, they are both more prosaic and more profound.

This is far from the first time right-wing governments have swept the Western Hemisphere. In 2000, Latin America was governed predominantly by conservative parties. Vicente Fox’s National Action Party had broken the death grip of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico, bringing an end to the “perfect dictatorship”; Alberto Fujimori was blundering through his final days as president-turned-dictator-turned-president-again in Peru; Hugo Banzer, once the military dictator of Bolivia, had returned to govern the country again, this time as a democratically elected president; and Fernando Cardoso was enjoying his second term as president of Brazil, having been reelected two years prior to great popular acclaim (in the process crushing a much younger Lula da Silva, his principal rival). Even the minor Latin American countries, from Costa Rica to Uruguay, were nearly all controlled by some flavor of conservative.

The George W. Bush administration hoped to capitalize on this to remake the hemisphere. “Should I become president, I will look south, not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment of my presidency,” Bush pledged during the 2000 campaign season, and his administration poured billions into Colombia and Mexico in a mostly unsuccessful attempt to smash the cartels and end the flow of drugs into the United States. But the Latin American prosperity the Bush White House hoped would come from right-wingers liberalizing their economies and embracing democracy never really materialized.

In fact, conservative dominance of Latin America at the turn of the century proved short-lived. Disillusioned voters turned back to the left, hoping that socialist economic policies might provide more concrete improvements to their quality of life. By 2008, the region had been swallowed up by the “pink tide,” a current that carried into power a generation of left-wing icons: Lula in Brazil, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina. 

Like democratic systems everywhere, Latin American politics is largely thermostatic: Voters grow frustrated with the government in power as it generates grievances, accumulates failures, and becomes associated with the political irritants of the day. Eventually, the popular backlash becomes strong enough that no policy program or charismatic leader can overcome it, and voters throw out the incumbents. The alternative does not even need to be particularly attractive—opposition parties with poor track records in government are frequently the beneficiaries of this trend, because voters have short memories and prefer parties whose great offenses they have forgotten to those whose offenses, though lesser, are daily paraded in front of them.

And Latin American political movements have plenty of opportunities to aggrieve their voters. The promised economic boom is always just around the corner, but never arrives; the politicians who yesterday denounced the graft of their predecessors today are outed for having secret mansions in Miami and hidden bank accounts in the Bahamas. Javier Milei was catapulted to an unanticipated victory in 2023 by savaging the Argentine political class for its corruption and self-dealing; now he is confronting his own corruption scandals.

In other words, though it may be true that “the left hasn’t won a single presidential election in Latin America” since we gutted USAID, it would be foolish to expect the trend to last. Indeed, whether the Trump administration’s destruction of the agency has any relation to this shift remains an open question—political slush funds and patronage from the U.S. have frequently aided the global left, but elections can be surprisingly hard to buy.

Apart from the general thermostatic trends, the Latin American right has benefited from other, more significant tailwinds than the abolition of USAID. South American countries have recently begun to experience their own illegal immigration crisis, driven almost entirely by Venezuelans fleeing the collapsing economy of the Maduro regime. Stopping mass migration and securing national borders, previously issues that barely registered with the public, have become major priorities, creating a political environment that played directly into the hands of the right (which has always been the champion of law and order). This issue may, ironically, soon fade away thanks to the Trump administration’s actions in Venezuela.

Another significant boost to the image and prestige of the Latin American right is the performance of President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Many a would-be caudillo has promised to bring down the mano dura (“iron fist”) and restore order and security to a broken society; Bukele has actually delivered. The transformation of El Salvador—from the most dangerous country in the hemisphere to a place that is by many metrics safer than the United States—is a more convincing pitch for Latin American right-wingers than any campaign speech or ad could be.

Effecting the kind of transformation that Bukele has accomplished is a tall order for any government—and, indeed, it may not be possible outside of the unique circumstances of El Salvador. But for the right-wing wave to last, that is what Latin America’s conservatives will need to deliver. Otherwise, expect yet another pink tide in 2030.

The post Why is Latin America Swinging to the Right? appeared first on The American Conservative.

AOC Claims the FBI and DOJ That Democrats Used to Investigate Trump Are Now Corrupt and Must be Investigated (VIDEO)

Screencap of Twitter/X video.

AOC of New York was recently in Maine campaigning for Troy Jackson.

During her remarks, she went off on a tangent about the FBI and the DOJ, suggesting that both agencies are corrupt and must be investigated.

Why? Because they’re going after her good friend Ilhan Omar.

AOC had no problem with the FBI or the DOJ when Democrats were using them to investigate Donald Trump, because that was just different.

Transcript via Real Clear Politics:

REP. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ (D-NY): First and foremost, everything that we are seeing unfold right now is an absolute weaponization of the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigations, point blank period. And I want to zoom out, you know, if you’re having a conversation with someone that isn’t sure about the details of what’s happening in the news and whatnot, just know that it has been standing practice in order to protect the integrity of our elections that the FBI and the DOJ do not take actions like these within a certain time frame of an election, regardless of what is happening in any circumstance of an investigation.

And so the very fact that this is happening in October and September tells you, period, that these agencies have been weaponized and compromised. So what we have to do, whether it’s this, whether it’s the corruption that we’ve seen with crypto and the ballroom and all of these things, is that we’ve known that Kash Patel has purged the FBI of many serious investigators. We’ve known that the Department of Justice has also been weaponized in its absolute groundless indictments of everyone from Tish James to Jerome Powell and so on and so forth.

Day one, we need to be opening investigations into the heads of every single one of these agencies, and we need to hold them accountable. I’m talking subpoenas. I’m talking investigations.

Watch the video:

It’s all fake outrage. She is such a hypocrite.

The post AOC Claims the FBI and DOJ That Democrats Used to Investigate Trump Are Now Corrupt and Must be Investigated (VIDEO) appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

Michigan Voter Explains to CNN’s Dana Bash That the Democrats Are No Longer the Party of the Working Class (VIDEO)

Screencap of Twitter/X video.

CNN’s Dana Bash recently spoke to a voter in Michigan who calmly explained to her that Democrats are no longer the party of the working class.

That may have been the case years ago, but these days every time a Democrat opens their mouth, they’re talking about trans issues, defending criminals, defending illegal immigrants, or how much they hate Trump. That’s it.

Trump is by far, a greater defender of the working class than anyone in today’s Democrat Party. Deep down, they know this and it drives them bonkers.

In the video, the man says: “Back in the day when my parents were Democrats, they represented the working class. They’ve lost that. They’ve moved so far to the left. We love our country. We don’t want to lose it. That’s the truth.”

Watch:

This is why when you hear far left DSA candidates talk, they bring up the working class in every other sentence. They know absolutely nothing about America’s working class, but consultants have told them to say it over and over.

This is what the far left thinks the working class is, according to AOC: “Working class was a euphemism for race and gender, and it was really about a very specific and only one slice of the working class.”

Watch:

It’s nothing more than a talking point to them, and one that they don’t even understand.

The post Michigan Voter Explains to CNN’s Dana Bash That the Democrats Are No Longer the Party of the Working Class (VIDEO) appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

What Is Another Round of Bombing in Iran Actually Going to Achieve?

What Is Another Round of Bombing in Iran Actually Going to Achieve?

The definition of insanity is doing the same thing and expecting a different result.

Secretary Of War Hegseth Hosts Korean Defense Minister At The Pentagon
Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

There is an awful lot of smoke going up around the whole war thing these days. The USS Theodore Roosevelt is in transit to the Persian Gulf region, where it is expected to arrive late next month. Pete Hegseth popped over to Israel Monday for a quick visit to Benjamin Netanyahu, whose air force has been engaging in some rather scary-looking maneuvers around Iranian airspace. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi penned an op-ed for the Financial Times discouraging the U.S. and company from taking another crack at his employer; Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Islamic Republic’s Supreme National Security Council, gave comment to Drop Site News to the same effect, albeit with a lot more growling and baring of teeth. The State Department is sending folks home, and the number of troops at regional bases is being reduced. The New York Times reports that the next round of strikes is planned for after the American midterm elections

Sometimes you have to restate the obvious—dirty work, but someone has to do it: Another round of strikes is unlikely to accomplish this war’s stated political goals, which themselves change on a regular basis. While never-ending, mindless destruction for its own sake has its charms, I guess, generally speaking a war is supposed to accomplish something; the “something” here has been at various times and non-exclusively the end of the Iranian nuclear program, reopening the Strait of Hormuz (which was open before the war), and regime change. The going theory among the teeming intellects downtown appears to be that yet another movement in the symphony of death, in concert with Scott Bessent’s exotic economic maneuvers, will get the Iranians to cry uncle and/or provoke a change of management in Tehran.

Anything is possible, but I wouldn’t hold my breath. Even if you ignore the actual public support for the Islamic Republic that this war has engendered, an indigenous uprising against the regime would likely provoke a civil war. Such a scenario won’t make the Hormuz safe or secure Iranian nuclear assets; energy markets will continue to make unhappy faces and low moaning noises until there is something like a settlement. Iran is not Syria; it is simply too large for us to indulge in a decade-long luxury war there. Instability will demand continued and intensive American attention until there’s a resolution. 

But, if we fall short of triggering a civil war and the regime remains securely ensconced, why would the Iranians be more tractable after yet another round of bombing? What will make this time different? (And if there is something substantively different about this approach, why didn’t we try it before burning through years’ worth of Patriot interceptors and compromising our force posture everywhere else in the world?)

If this line of questioning seems repetitive, that’s because it is. There has been a fundamental disjunction of military means and political ends from the very beginning of this war (really, since the 12-Day War, but we can afford to be generous when there are so many more recent and egregious stupidities to anatomize). Getting Iran to—to what? To dismantle its nuclear program completely? To give up its newfound leverage in the Hormuz? To embrace liberal democracy? The answer continues to change, depending on the day and which creeping thing from the administration is doing the talking. In any case, getting Iran to do it, whatever it is, can only be accomplished by negotiation or the application of main force. (Welcome to the academic discipline of international relations.) Main force is expensive and painful, and you always need more of it than you think; even after a couple years of indiscriminate air war, Nazi Germany didn’t fall until there was a ground invasion, and it went down fighting tooth and claw. The ceiling for negotiated outcomes may be lower, but diplomacy is less costly and less painful.

But, as the song says, you can’t get what you want ‘til you know what you want. Political prudence is about matching means to ends. While the baboon-like Hegseth and his catamites at CENTCOM may find meaning and pleasure in death per se, the actual humans in the administration should reconsider blowing another few dozen billion dollars on more of the same. A fresh round of bombing is unlikely to move us closer to economic normality and a stable settlement in the Middle East; nor is it likely to move the Republicans further away from the electoral pillory, not just in the midterms, but in 2028. The fundamentals haven’t changed. Why hasn’t our strategy?

The post What Is Another Round of Bombing in Iran Actually Going to Achieve? appeared first on The American Conservative.

Supreme Court Says New Hampshire Can Ban Voters from Using Student IDs at Polls in Midterms – Ketanji Brown Jackson Dissents

The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled 7-1 that New Hampshire can indeed stop voters from using student IDs at polls during the midterm elections.

The high court paused a lower court’s ruling that allowed student IDs to be using as a form of voter identification.

Liberal Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented.

“I respectfully dissent because—even, and perhaps especially, when an election is looming—I would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes,” Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote in her dissent.

The Hill reported:

The Supreme Court on Thursday ruled New Hampshire’s top election official can fully stop voters from using their student IDs when showing up to the polls in the midterms — a request backed by the Republican National Committee (RNC).

A lower judge ruled officials had improperly gone further than a new state law placing restrictions on student IDs to get a ballot.

The judge said the state still needed to consider student IDs alongside other evidence when a voter lacks other ways to prove their identity.

The Supreme Court chastised the judge for intervening too close to November’s contests.

The high court has said such orders can cause voter confusion, known as the Purcell principle. The opinion points to the recent legal whiplash over Missouri’s redistricting as one recent example.

“Here, the District Court did not point to anything that would justify deviating from that principle,” the majority wrote in its unsigned, one-paragraph opinion.

The post Supreme Court Says New Hampshire Can Ban Voters from Using Student IDs at Polls in Midterms – Ketanji Brown Jackson Dissents appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

Watch Elizabeth Warren SQUIRM When Questioned About Billionaires Funding the Democrats in the Midterms (VIDEO)

Screencap of YouTube video.

Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts was recently grilled – on CNN of all places – about the fact that despite all of the Democrat Party’s complaints about billionaires, they are being funded for the midterms by quite a few of them.

The whole billionaire thing on the left is so tiresome. It all goes back to Bernie Sanders. He used to be the only one who talked about it but now they all do.

Of course, they all conveniently look the other way when a billionaire is ready to hand them a massive campaign donation.

It’s still hard to believe this conversation happened on CNN.

FOX News reports:

Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., got defensive in a new interview as she railed against billionaire donations in politics and was asked about Democrat Troy Jackson revealing multiple billionaire donors, as well as a large possible donation from Michael Bloomberg.

CNN’s Kaitlan Collins said during an interview with Warren that Bloomberg had given about $80 million to help Democrats win the midterms after noting that Elon Musk had contributed $276 million to Republicans.

Collins asked Warren, “You’re someone who has said billionaire donors should not be in politics. Given what you’ve said, do you want Michael Bloomberg’s help here?”

“Look, what I want is to get this kind of money out of politics,” Warren said. “Right now, the Republicans know that their only chance, as they see it, to be able to hang on to the House and the Senate and some of these governors’ mansions is to be able to just drown people in money, to be able to run all the ads on TV, to lie, to cheat, and that there won’t be any opportunity for Democrats to be able to respond.”

“We need to push back because, this campaign, this 2026 midterm, really is about the money or the people. Because the Democrats have got the people on their side. The Republicans have got the money, and they think if they can spend it, they can maintain control of this country, and I sure hope they’re wrong,” Warren said, arguing for a “very different” system.

Watch the video:

Democrats love their talking points about billionaires because it stokes a sense of class warfare.

Not only do they not mind being divisive, they see it as a campaign strategy.

The post Watch Elizabeth Warren SQUIRM When Questioned About Billionaires Funding the Democrats in the Midterms (VIDEO) appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

Katy Tur of MSNOW Says She is Having Doubts About Midterm Polling in Texas After Traveling There (VIDEO)

Screencap of YouTube video.

If you listen to Democrats, the media, and polling firms, you might believe that Texas is about to turn bright blue. Yet if you spend any time with actual Texans, you probably have a very different view.

This is what happened to Katy Tur of MSNOW. She recently said on the air that she has become ‘skeptical’ about midterm polling in Texas after she spent some time on the ground in the state.

Tur even went so far as to wonder if pollsters are just reporting what they think people want to hear.

From Mediaite:

MS NOW anchor Katy Tur spoke to Puck News co-founder Peter Hamby on Thursday about the latest polling heading into the midterms and whether or not Democrats may be overestimating their lead.

“All right, Peter’s back with us. Let’s talk about polling. Is this just a product of pollsters really not wanting to be wrong and trying to invent ways to say, ‘We could be wrong, maybe it’s this,’ because the polling does look so outrageously bad for Republicans right now?” Tur asked during the conversation…

“Yeah, and there’s also just a feeling. This is what I was getting when I was in Texas, and I’m a little more skeptical of the polling in Texas, having been there, because I did just get a lot of ‘I’m going to vote for the team,’ which was the message from Angie Nixon, which means you have a terrible candidate. But the polling, or the Republican impulse, is so deeply ingrained in Texas, and it feels like it’s hard to break, which makes me wonder about what you found, or what you’re reporting about, which is: are pollsters getting honest answers, or are they just getting the answers that people think they want to hear?” Tur replied.

Here’s the clip:

Polling has become almost useless.

We now have two polling companies in this election cycle alone which have been revealed to be completely fake.

They’re destroying their own industry.

The post Katy Tur of MSNOW Says She is Having Doubts About Midterm Polling in Texas After Traveling There (VIDEO) appeared first on The Gateway Pundit.

Hillary Clinton Slams Matthew McConaughey Over “Really Unfortunate” Calls to Support Independent Candidates (VIDEO)

Hillary Clinton speaks at the 92nd Street Y event in New York, addressing key political issues while holding a microphone.

Hillary Clinton speaks at the 92nd Street Y event in New York, addressing key political issues while holding a microphone.

Failed Presidential Candidate and former First Lady Hillary Clinton appeared on a liberal podcast yesterday, where she slammed actor Matthew McConaughey over recent comments he made, innocently reminding people that they have the right to vote for whoever they want this election cycle. 

McConaughey posted a social media video this week, reminding people that they don’t need to vote just Republican or Democrat this November, arguing that “Independents belong in the fight,” while noting, “I’m not telling you who to vote for.”

“They’ve been telling us for years that an independent vote is a wasted vote. Well, a great question for our times is: has that unwasted vote been working out for you?” he said.

“I’m telling you to look at your ballot, study up, see if they represent you, what you believe in, check if they can be that voice of reason in the middle for you, and if they can, treat them like a potential winner because they can be.”

Kara Swisher played the clip and asked Hillary Clinton for her thoughts on her “High Stakes” podcast yesterday.

It was basically a thought crime for Clinton, who suggested that it was irresponsible for McConaughey to use his platform in such a way, “two weeks before a midterm.”

So much for “Democracy” and self-determination.

Whether you agree with McConaughey or not is irrelevant. What Clinton is saying is that he shouldn’t have an opinion.

“I think it’s really unfortunate that, you know, somebody who’s such a great actor with such a reach would be two weeks before a midterm that is aimed at stopping Trump’s corruption, impunity, and extreme damage to country would suggest that any independent candidate is really a better choice,” Clinton said.

“Right now, we have a broad range of Democrats running, and Democrats are representing, I think, every kind of American in these elections, and we know — I mean, it’s just a fact — we know that if we don’t vote for Democrats to defeat Republicans, then Trump will have two more unchecked years to do whatever he wants to our country.”

WATCH:

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